In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms by Melnick, Katie
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 22 
Issue 3 Volume 22, Winter 2008, Issue 3 Article 6 
December 2008 
In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the 
Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms 
Katie Melnick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Melnick, Katie (2008) "In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the Implicit Advantages 
and a Response to Common Criticisms," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 22 : Iss. 
3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol22/iss3/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
IN DEFENSE OF THE CLASS ACTION
LAWSUIT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
IMPLICIT ADVANTAGES AND A RESPONSE
TO COMMON CRITICISMS
KATIE MELNICK*
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the role of the attorney in the American justice
system has been that of an advocate, zealously arguing in court
to protect his injured client's rights.1 While there are still attor-
neys who fit this ideal, a shedding of the proverbial innocent skin
began to take place in the 1960's. 2 At that time, the traditional
class action lawsuit became available to the masses.3 Tradition-
ally rooted in equity, the class action was not a pre-eminent force
until the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
J.D. Candidate, May 2007.
I See M. Neil Browne et al., The Purported Rigidity of an Attorney's Personality: Can
Legal Ethics Be Acquired?, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 55, 69 (2005) (noting that attorney's tradi-
tional role is that of zealous advocate); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analy-
sis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (stating that tradi-
tional role of attorney is a professional who provides advice on behalf of his client).
2 See Natalie C. Scott, Don't Forget Me! The Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 561, 562 (2002) (stating that while attorneys are traditionally considered
"officer[s] of the court" and "staunch advocate[s]," Rule 23 class action lawsuits have given
rise to ethical concerns that stem from fact that attorneys in class action lawsuits repre-
sent numerous clients whom they never meet and have little connection with); see also
Joel Seligman & Lindsey Hunter, Rule 23: Class Actions at the Crossroads, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 407, 408-09 (1997) (explaining how Rule 23 was amended in 1966).
3 See Seligman & Hunter, supra note 2, at 408-09 (stating that drafters of 1966
amendments agreed that class action lawsuits should be available to classes of people
sharing common issues of law or fact, and purpose of amendments was to "enable litiga-
tion")(internal quotations omitted); see also Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation:
Plagued By Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REV 589,
590-91 (2004) (describing amendments to Rule 23 as expanding scope of class action liti-
gation to include actions for injunctive relief and monetary damages).
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dure.4 It was at that time that Rule 23(b)(3), the damage class ac-
tion lawsuit, was amended to allow class actions in situations
where there were common questions of law or fact, and these
questions predominated.5 This shift from the functional to the
practical had the effect of allowing class actions even when there
were no joint rights.6 As a result, individual plaintiffs were given
the ability to raise actionable claims despite the fact that dam-
ages suffered by the individuals themselves were "relatively
small and outweighed by the hefty expense and burden of indi-
vidual litigation." 7 An increase in the popularity of the class ac-
tion lawsuit followed as the new suits "level[ed] the playing field"
and made it "possible for ... individual investors to seek redress
for wrongful corporate conduct."8 As the class action became a
tool more available to the masses, legal scholars began to dismiss
such suits as nothing more than legalized black mail.9 In fact,
when one takes into account the cost of litigating combined with
notice pleadings and broad discovery rules, the deck does in fact
appear stacked in favor of the plaintiffs. 10
4 See Sherman, supra note 3, at 590-91 (noting that historically class actions in America
were actions in equity, and were allowed only in limited situations where joint rights or
rights against specific property were asserted, and that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23
expanded class actions to include suits for injunctive or monetary relief); see also Susan T.
Spence, Looking Back . . . In a Collective Way: A Short History of Class Action Law, 11
A.B.A. Bus. LAW TODAY No. 6 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.orgbuslawblt/2002-
07-08/spence.html (stating "the modern American class action evolved on the equity side
of the courthouse" and that American class actions changed dramatically with the 1966
amendments to Rule 23).
5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Sherman, supra note 3, at 591 (describing Rule
23(b)(3) as significant development insofar as it permitted class actions for damages
where questions of law or fact are common to members of the class).
6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Sherman, supra note 3, at 590 (noting that 1966
amendments to Rule 23 expanded class actions to include suits for injunctive or monetary
relief).
7 Sanford P. Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the Effect of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY, ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY MATERIALS 501 (2005).
sId.
9 See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
one of main problems with class action lawsuit is that some attorneys are "happy to sell
out a class they anyway can't do much for in exchange for generous attorneys' fees"); see
also Scott, supra note 2, at 561 (describing numerous criticisms "levied against the class
action," including allegations that plaintiffs' attorneys tend to settle cases prematurely in
order to collect large sums in attorneys fees).
10 See Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner's View of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 328 (1997) (stating historically the costs of class action
litigation are high); see also Scott, supra note 2, at 576 (noting that cost of providing no-
tice of class action lawsuit can be astronomical).
[Vol. 22:3
IN DEFENSE OF THE CLASS ACTION LA WSUIT
This note will examine some of the common negative reactions
to the class action lawsuit and will argue that such lawsuits ac-
tually do serve an important function within the legal world; and
that perhaps the main problem lies not with the class action it-
self but with the overarching view that the class action can be
molded to resemble other forms of litigation. When seen in light
of the implicit advantages that such lawsuits bring to the fore-
front, it seems that the class action is much more than "legalized
extortion." 1
I. "CLASSLESS ACTIONS": A RESPONSE TO COMMON CRITICISMS OF
THE CLASS ACTION
A. Solicitation of Clients
In the most traditional sense, litigation begins when an injured
client seeks legal representation. The attorney then pursues the
claims on behalf of the client, with the client's interests as the fo-
cal point of the litigation.12 According to Model Rule 1.2(a), the
client determines the objectives of the representation and the at-
torney is duty bound to comply with such objectives. 13 This tradi-
tional view of the attorney is largely perverted in the forum of
class action litigation, 14 where it is often the attorney himself
who solicits the client, turning himself into more of a "calculating
11 See Gregg H. Curry, Conflicts of Interest Problems for Lawyers Representing a Class
in a Class Action Lawsuit, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 397, 398 (2000) (maintaining that "the class
action is a mechanism created to serve unique purposes and to protect unique interests");
see, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Fighting to Keep Employment Discrimination Class Ac-
tions Alive: How Allison v. Citgo's Predomination Requirement Threatens to Undermine
Title VII Enforcement, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 405, 408 (2005) (pointing out im-
portance of class action litigation in civil rights law). See generally Bhavik R. Patel, Secu-
rities Regulation--Fraud--Rule 10b-5 No Longer Scares the Judiciary, but May Scare Cor-
porate Defendants: The United States Supreme Court Switches Directions. Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd. v. United International Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001), 25 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 191, 207 (2002) (acknowledging importance of class action litigation
to securities field).
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
14 See Samuel Issacharoff, Program: AALS Section on Civil Procedures: Class Action
Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 805 (1997) (suggesting "[c]lass actions occupy an un-
certain position in Anglo-American law[,]" departing significantly from traditional legal
model). See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (positing that attorneys in class
action litigation do not fit into traditional mold of the attorney).
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entrepreneur" than the quintessential advocate. 15 This scenario
is perhaps most obvious in large-scale, small-claim litigation,
where the overall liability is large but the individual interests of
the class members are small.16 In such litigation, the attorneys
stand to gain more from the potential settlement than any one
individual.17 This reversal of traditional roles has caused many in
the legal community to dismiss the class action as a means by
which class action attorneys set themselves up to receive wind-
falls from eventual settlements, using clients as mere pawns in
their (the attorneys') eventual recovery.18
A prime example of the large scale small claim litigation can be
seen in Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.19 In that case, plaintiffs
(solicited by an attorney) commenced an action on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated residential home sellers
claiming that defendants fixed brokerage commissions in realty
15 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-79 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding] (explaining in
context of class action the client often only has nominal stake in outcome of litigation and
is therefore attorney who has more of vested interest in litigation); see also Edward Bru-
net, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 403, 405-06 (2003) (explaining most criticisms of class action suits are because
"customary principal-agent relationship between attorney ... and the client . . . fails to
exist in the typical class action [and t]he entrepreneurial incentives of attorneys who spe-
cialize in class actions transform this relationship into the converse connection in which
the attorney becomes the principal and the unsophisticated client becomes the agent, with
minimal ability to monitor the behavior of the class action counsel.").
16 See Brunet, supra note 15, at 406-07 (discussing "sweetheart deal" scenario in which
attorney for plaintiffs will make favorable deals with defense attorneys to primary benefit
of attorneys, not the client); see also Coffee, Understanding, supra note 15, at 678 (de-
scribing that in the context of class actions the actual client only has a nominal stake in
the outcome of the litigation).
17 See Coffee, Understanding, supra note 15, at 678 (explaining how our legal system
has accepted the concept of the plaintiffs attorney as an entrepreneur in many ways, in-
cluding allowing attorney to settle over objections of actual client); see also Fact Sheet:
Securing Our Economic Future (Dec. 15, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/news/releases/2004/12/20041215-3.html (discussing how many class action suits are
"heavily abused" and "injured parties often receive awards of little or no value while law-
yers receive large fees").
18 John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Law-
yer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218-19 (1983) [hereinafter Cof-
fee, Rescuing] (stating that "[l]ower federal judges have been even more explicit in their
view that the legal system is being exploited, rather than aided, by such attorneys"); see
Brunet, supra note 15, at 406-07 (suggesting that lack of sufficient oversight to monitor
the class action attorney may lead to self-interested collusion with the defense).
19 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974).
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sales.20 Though facially the plaintiffs alleged that defendants had
violated section one of the Sherman Act,21 what is particularly
striking about this case is that the named plaintiff had in fact
only suffered minor pecuniary damages as a result of the pur-
ported fixed commissions. 22 Additionally, the court noted that out
of the 400,000 sellers the plaintiffs claimed they were to repre-
sent, only one other plaintiff had come forward or expressed any
interest in the litigation. 23 Given the small amount the plaintiffs
stood to gain, and the extraordinary lack of interest on behalf of
the "class," it was posited that the case was nothing more than
the brainchild of attorneys. 24 While the class was never certified
because it was held to be unsuitable for class action treatment, it
is important to note the court's focus on the perversion of the at-
torney client relationship and the visceral reaction that the
judges had when confronted with the notion that "the real bo-
nanza in a case like this, if it is won, will go to counsel."25
Attorney-solicitation of clients is also apparent in the intersec-
tion of the medical and legal worlds, more specifically within the
realm of prescription drugs.26 In this scenario, a plaintiffs attor-
20 Id. at 228.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 236-37 (Duniway, J., concurring) (explaining that Kline had sold single prop-
erty and paid single commission, and therefore the maximum damages would be $2500 or
$7650 trebled).
23 Id. at 237.
24 Id. at 238 (quoting Judge Duniway's opinion that "none of the class actions features
of this case was dreamed up by the named plaintiffs, but that all of them are the brain
children of their attorneys").
25 Id. at 237. Perhaps the most egregious example of client solicitation comes on the
heels of a mass disaster, where the attorney attempts to gain access to the suffering fami-
lies in their time of need and, under the guise of consoling the grief stricken family, en-
courages them to file suit. The behavior of the attorneys following the Pan Am crash over
Lockerbie, Scotland truly illustrated how aggressive and unfeeling attorneys can be in
their pursuit of clientele. While it is important to note that in situations of mass disasters,
a lawsuit will inevitably follow because wherever death is involved, the potential for re-
covery is quite high. That being said, it is the behavior of the attorneys in the face of dis-
asters that many find offensive. See Grace Najarian, Balancing Act: New Jersey Walks a
Line Between the Pros and Cons of Attorney Solicitation of Clients, 29 SETON HALL L. REV.
1543, 1558-59 (1999).
26 See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 721 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (representing
plaintiffs' attempt to certify a class whose members comprise "all persons who ingested, in
Missouri before their eighth birthday, or whose mothers ingested, in Missouri during
pregnancy with such persons, a drug of the tetracycline class agent"); see also Ratliff v.
Merck & Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 571, 576 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (representing lawsuit against
Merck alleging that 'ingestion of [VIOXX(R)] exposes individuals to an increased risk of
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ney gets word that a drug has been taken off the market or that
complications have been reported in those who have ingested the
drug.27 He subsequently begins to advertise, encouraging people
to contact him if they have (or anyone in their family has) ever
taken the medicine. 28 In such situations, even if the individual
does not feel particularly injured, he is painted a picture of a no-
risk, high-reward scenario. 29 These advertising campaigns in fact
serve the dual purpose of not only alerting people that they may
have been injured in the first place, but also of providing them a
means through which they can rectify their injuries. 30
In the 1980s, tetracycline became the focal point of significant
legal attention when individuals, inspired by attorneys, began to
sue on behalf of themselves and others who had ingested the
cardiovascular events' and that individuals who used VIOXX(R) 'now need to see their
physician for consultation regarding their use of the drug").
27 See Michael Isikoff, Defective-Products Claims Cause Legal Morass; Lawyers, Not Vic-
tims, Are Source of Most Problems When Punitive Damages Are Sought, Critics Claim,
WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1985, at M2 (criticizing legal system as being driven by plaintiffs'
attorneys seeking enormous punitive damage awards that result in larger contingency
fees for attorneys in products liability cases); see also Sebastian Mallaby, No Defense For
This Insanity, WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A19 (suggesting reform in legal system in
light of Vioxx lawsuits which "sink a flagship scientific company in order to line the pock-
ets of unscrupulous lawyers").
28 See, e.g., The Kahn Law Firm, http://thekahnlawfirm.com/personal/drug/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2007) ("If you or someone you love has been injured as a result of VIOXX, contact
our lawyers. We have the experience needed to help you file a successful VIOXX lawsuit.
Depending on your jurisdiction, time limitations may apply to the filing of your VIOXX
lawsuit claim. It is important to know your legal rights."); see also Tequin Lawsuit,
http://tequinlawsuit.lawinfo.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (encouraging indi-
viduals or their loved ones who had suffered blood sugar problems after taking a particu-
lar drug to "Take Action NOW to Protect Your Legal Rights!").
29 See, e.g., The Kahn Law Firm, http://thekahnlawfirm.comlpersonal/drug/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2007) (advertising that contacting the firm "is free and there is no commitment").
20 See, e.g., The Montgomery Law Firm, LLC, http://www.montgomerylaw.org/vioxx
_legal-options.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) ("There are a number of Vioxx legal options
open to those affected by Vioxx. It is anticipated that many affected patients will file a
compensation claim or lawsuit against Merck, and this can be done in one of two ways.
You can file an individual lawsuit for compensation from Merck, and for this you should
employ the services of an experienced and skilled Vioxx lawyer."); Tequin Lawsuit,
http:/tequinlawsuit.lawinfo.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) ("If you or some-
one close to you has used Tequin, a medical examination should be scheduled immediately
•.. If you are diagnosed with diabetes or other diseases and conditions associated with
the use of Tequin, you may be entitled to recover substantial financial compensation ...
Your physician can attend to your medical requirements, and an experienced and quali-
fied Tequin litigation attorney can help protect your legal rights.").
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drug, or whose mothers had ingested the drug.31 Plaintiffs claim-
ing that the drug caused tooth damage and discoloration sued the
pharmaceutical manufacturers. 32 As word spread, cases emerged
across the country, all seeking damages on behalf of others simi-
larly situated.33 Today there is conclusive evidence that giving
tetracycline to children whose teeth are developing, or to mothers
who are pregnant or lactating, can cause tooth discoloration. 34
Even at the time the litigation began, there was strong evidence
indicating a correlation between ingesting the drug and eventual
tooth damage and discoloration. 35 This aside, when one looks at
the cases from that era, a significant trend begins to emerge. As
the cases progressed, the injuries that were the inspiration for
the litigation fell to the side, as attorneys pushed for the certifi-
cation of larger classes and larger recoveries for themselves. 36
31 See Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1218 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting plaintiffs' at-
torneys filed eight tetracycline products liability actions against nine pharmaceutical
manufacturers on the same day).
32 See Albright, 788 F.2d at 1218 (alleging that defendants involved in the manufacture
and sale of tetracycline-based drugs were responsible for plaintiffs' permanent tooth stain
and discoloration); see also In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. at 722 (naming manufac-
turers of drug tetracycline as defendants in claim for damages to those who ingested the
drug prior to tooth development).
33 See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. at 725-26 (identifying common questions of
fact and law for which tetracycline plaintiffs sought class certification); see also Laura J.
Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 736 (2003) (not-
ing that plaintiffs received partial class certification to proceed in their mass tort claim).
34 See PDR Health, Tetracycline, http://www.pdrhealth.com/drug-info/rxdrugprofiles
/drugs/tet1439.html ("Tetracycline should not be used during the last half of pregnancy or
in children under the age of 8. It may damage developing teeth and cause permanent dis-
coloration."); see also Jonathan A. Ship, Tooth Discoloration, eMedicine.com,
http://www.emedicine.com/derm/topic646.htm (Oct. 27, 2005) ("Since the 1950s, drugs
from the tetracycline family have been associated with intrinsic tooth discoloration. Once
in the bloodstream, tetracycline can be incorporated into the calcification process of devel-
oping teeth, in which it affects either primary or secondary dentition after maternal or
childhood ingestion .. ".).
35 See Morton Mintz, Tetracycline Rx Deemed Still a Peril to Children, WASH. POST,
Sept. 24, 1977, at A4 (stating that since 1970 FDA required drug suppliers to warn of
dangers of tooth discoloration in children who take tetracycline); see also C.J. Tredwin et
al., Drug-induced Disorders of Teeth, J. DENT. RES. 84(7): 596, 597 (2005) ("In the early
1960's, clinical evidence began to appear suggesting that tetracycline could cause tooth
discoloration.").
36 See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. at 721-22 (indicating that two tetracycline
cases had turned into a battle of whether to allow additions to the class of plaintiffs in
amended complaints and motions to expand the class); but see Ratliff v. Merck & Co., 359
F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (adjudicating dispute in which plaintiff argues damages
are no more than $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction while defendant argues they
are).
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Most recently, the drug Vioxx has garnered attention as the
center of the class action world. Merck, a drug company, origi-
nally marketed the drug as treatment for arthritis pain.37 On
September 30, 2004, Merck voluntarily withdrew the drug from
the market after studies indicated that taking the drug could po-
tentially increase a patient's risk of heart attack and stroke.
38
Following the withdrawal, the solicitation began. Plaintiffs' at-
torneys began to run advertising campaigns on the Internet, the
subway, the television, and on city buses encouraging people to
join in a class action lawsuit if they had ever taken Vioxx. 39 Ad-
vertisements demanded that people stand up for their rights and
demand retribution for the wrong that had been perpetrated. 40
The problem that many see with the behavior that seems to fol-
low prescription drug disasters is not that these cases are being
litigated or that the drug companies are being forced to answer
for their behavior.41 In fact, providing a forum for the litigation of
these cases is something that many would argue is an important
and necessary function of the American legal system. 42 The is-
37 See CBS News, Healthwatch, Merck Yanks Vioxx From Shelves, http://www.cbs
news.com/stories/2004/10/06/health/main647872.shtml (2004) (last visited Oct. 15, 2007)
(stating that Vioxx was the "blockbuster" arthritis drug and was heavily marketed and
promoted); see also Merck & Co., Vioxx, http://www.vioxx.com/rofecoxib/vioxx/consumer
/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (explaining that Merck is a drug company, and
VIOXX is a Merck product).
38 Merck & Co., Vioxx, http://www.vioxx.com/rofecoxib/vioxx/consumer/index.jsp (last
visited Oct. 15, 2007) (offering company's explanation of the withdrawal); see Merck With-
draws Vioxx; FDA Issues Public Health Advisory, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE (2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac /features/2004/604_vioxx.html (supporting Merck's
decision to withdraw Vioxx) (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
39 See, e.g., The Kahn Law Firm, http://thekahnlawfirm.com/personal/drug/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2007) (serving as an example of an online advertisement from a law firm seeking
clients who have suffered a Vioxx related injury); Tequin Lawsuit,
http://tequinlawsuit.lawinfo.com/index.html (Oct. 15, 2007) (providing encouragement and
information about contacting an attorney if one has suffered a Tequin side effect).
40 See, e.g., The Kahn Law Firm, http://thekahnlawfirm.com/personal/drug/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2007) (providing facts which tend to increase Merck's culpability); The Montgom-
ery Law Firm, LLC, http://www.montgomerylaw.org/vioxx.legal -options.php (last visited
Oct. 15, 2007) (insisting people with certain symptoms call an attorney in order to protect
their rights).
41 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (lamenting the lack of oversight of class action
attorneys by their clients and likening them to "entrepreneurs," but not arguing that
there should be no mechanism for recovery in these situations); see also Eric S. Roth, Con-
fronting Solicitation of Mass Disaster Victims, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 967, 969 (1989)
(criticizing the suits on the potential for abuse and not for the possibilities of redress).
42 When the injuries are small to each member of a class but large overall, it is cost
prohibitive to bring the actions individually and so the class action is necessary in order
for litigation to proceed. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 8-9. Utilization of the term
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sues instead arise with the behavior of the attorneys, who seem
to forget that they are in fact representing injured individuals
and appear to be arguing for nothing more than their own mone-
tary gain. 43
Within the class action context, this scenario of attorneys pub-
licly soliciting for clients is particularly apparent because often
the incidents that attract the so-called "ambulance chasers" are
widespread in scale and similarly attract much media atten-
tion. 44 As both media and attorneys descend on this now truly
public event, the attorneys' behavior and questionable conduct is
simultaneously thrust into the public eye.45
This appearance of attorneys in search of a windfall following a
disaster or other widely publicized event is undeniably disturb-
ing. 46 It is specifically this farce of attorneys turning themselves
into businessmen and representing plaintiffs in name only, while
essentially advocating for their (the attorneys') own pecuniary
gain that is unsettling, both to the public and the legal commu-
nity.47 It is this same client solicitation that is a major impetus
"private attorney general" instead of "bounty hunter" lends credence to the idea that the
fact that a liable corporation has to pay, regardless of whether or not this payment in the
end produces just compensation for the wrong, has become part of the way the modern
legal system deters such behavior. See Coffee, Rescuing, supra note 18, at 218.
43 See Roth, supra note 41, at 968 (stating that some attorneys are solely interested in
their own pecuniary gain); see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2002)
(admonishing attorneys from entering into relationships with clients for their own pecu-
niary gain).
44 See Roth, supra note 41, at 967-68 (explaining that motivation behind client solicita-
tion following a mass disaster, and using Pan Am disaster as an example, is the money
that is at stake and further maintaining that the larger the disaster the more money at
stake and therefore the bigger impetus to begin soliciting); see also Craig R. Whitney, Jet-
liner Carrying 258 to U.S. Crashes in Scottish Town, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1988, at Al
(demonstrating general newsworthiness of the Pan Am disaster).
45 See Najarian, supra note 25, at 1544-45 (claiming that solicitations have undeniably
"caused irreparable harm to the public's perception of the legal profession"); see also Roth,
supra note 41, at 967 (discussing how individuals involved in mass disasters are often
contacted by attorneys at a time when they least want to be bothered).
46 See Roth, supra note 41, at 969 (articulating theory that what makes people so un-
comfortable about the appearance of attorneys following a mass disaster is the "potential
for abuse" because the victims are too shocked to fully reason and understand the deci-
sions with which they are faced); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 1
(2002) (noting concern arising from practices that "subject the layperson to the private
importuning of the trained advocate," though here referring explicitly to face to face en-
counters).
47 See Roth, supra note 41, at 968-69 (explaining that when attorneys are driven solely
by the opportunity to make money it flies in the face of the traditional view of attorney as
advocate). See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2002) (prohibiting
approaching a potential client for pecuniary gain).
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towards perpetuating the negative view of class actions.48 How-
ever, those that dismiss class actions as a perversion of the nor-
mal or standard attorney client relationship fail to recognize that
these attorneys are in fact serving an important function.49 The
victims of a disaster or for that matter any illegal activity, do in
fact need legal representation and the presence of attorneys
serves the function of providing the victims with both access to
an attorney and immediate legal advice. 50 While this may pro-
voke visceral reactions because attorneys do stand to gain from
the potential representation they are soliciting, without their
presence the victims would be left to fend for themselves. 51 This
scenario becomes particularly important when one examines the
fact that following many legal infractions, the defendants' insur-
ance companies will certainly attempt to convince victims not to
acquire legal representation by maintaining that the insurance
company is prepared to offer a "generous settlement."52 Conse-
quently, while the idea of attorneys soliciting clients is perhaps
offensive, there is no more assured way of protecting an injured
48 See Robert Anthony, Note, Protection for Attorney Solicitation Slow In Coming, 33 U.
FLA. L. REV. 698, 709-10 (1981) (stating that in-person solicitation have inherent risks of
"fraud, deception, coercion, harassment, misrepresentation, and overreaching"); see also
Roth, supra note 41, at 968 (positing that while it is a minority of attorneys that act in
such an egregious manner, "this minority of attorneys casts a blemish on the legal profes-
sion," and holding that such conduct is detrimental to both the injured plaintiffs and the
legal profession alike).
19 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethics of Communicating with Putative Class Members,
17 REV. LITIG. 497, 513 (1998) (discussing risks of insurance companies seeking quick set-
tlements that may overreach tort victims); see also Roth, supra note 41, at 975-76 (ex-
plaining how insurance companies often arrive on scene of accidents in same manner as
attorneys, attempting to convince victims not to accept legal representation by assuring
them that insurance company has best interest of injured party in mind).
50 See Evan R. Levy, Edenfield v. Fane: In-Person Solicitation by Professionals Revisited
- What Makes Lawyers Different?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 261, 280-81(1994) (describing how some
believe in-person solicitation provides an opportunity for attorneys to tailor to the specific
needs of the individual which may offer more benefits than other forms of advertising); see
also Roth, supra note 41, at 968 (stating that it is not the presence of the attorneys that is
necessarily troubling, as they can protect the victims and their families from the insur-
ance companies).
51 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. (2002) (discussing the potentials
for abuse inherent in in-person contact because they subject the layperson to the private
importuning of a trained advocate); but see Roth, supra note 41, at 967 (discussing how
insurance company representatives are on the scene of a mass accident as soon as possi-
ble, "offer[ing] assurances that the company will take care of the victims and their rela-
tives".
52 Roth, supra note 41, at 967-68 (describing the ordinary practices of insurance compa-
nies).
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party's rights. Were attorneys to refrain from solicitation, those
who had been injured would still be faced with an onslaught of
insurance representatives, cajoling and pressuring them to settle
for a pittance. 53 With this as the backdrop, it becomes apparent
that legal presence can be much more than a perversion of the
normal attorney-client relationship. Despite the fact that these
attorneys are soliciting clients and do stand to gain from the re-
tention of the victims, they are ultimately serving the important
legal goals of assuring that each person has adequate legal rep-
resentation to guide his decisions and no person is forced to face
opposing counsel (i.e. attorneys for the insurance companies) un-
represented. 54
B. Settlement/Contingency Fees
Class actions have also been criticized for the way in which
their fee arrangements misalign the interests of the attorney
with the interests of the client, pitting the attorney's interests
against those of his client in the case.55 The idea of the contin-
gency fee exemplifies such concerns.5 6 A contingency fee ar-
rangement is one in which the attorney agrees to represent his
client for no fee unless the lawsuit is successful or is settled out
of court. 57 In such arrangements, the attorney receives no com-
53 See Roth, supra note 41, at 968-69 (stating that "[t]here is a conflict of interest be-
cause the insurance company is more interested in protecting its own financial interest
than in adequately compensating victims"); see also Steven Smucker, Low Insurance-
Company Settlements Prompt Personal-Injury Lawsuits, THE SUN. OREGONIAN, Mar. 5,
1995, at E02 ("If insurance companies offered fair settlements on injury claims in the first
place, most people would not call lawyers.").
54 See Roth, supra note 41, at 969 (concluding that "[a] valuable service may be ren-
dered to the victims and their families when they are informed of their legal rights and of
their legal options"); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3 (1983) (stat-
ing that "[t]he giving of advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfill-
ment of the duty of the legal profession to assist laypersons in recognizing legal prob-
lems").
55 See Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 535 (1978) (concluding that "an important goal in structuring legal
fees should be the elimination, or at least the minimization, of economic conflict of inter-
est between lawyer and client"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 23 ("[T]here is a
substantial deviation of interests between attorney and client.").
56 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 55, at 534 (stating that "[n]umerous conflicts of
interest exist between lawyer and client, many of them economic in nature"); Macey &
Miller, supra note 1, at 17-18 (describing how contingency fees may cause situations
where attorneys neglect their client's interests).
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 (2000) (defining con-
tingency fee).
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pensation until the suit is finished, and at that time, both the at-
torney and client receive their compensation simultaneously. 58
Within the class action context, however, the contingency fee
works differently. While again the attorney will not recover until
his client (the class) recovers, the person that truly stands to gain
the greatest piece of the recovery is the attorney himself and not
any individual client.59 This can lead to tensions between the at-
torney and the class members as the attorney has an incentive to
settle early and therefore maximize his possible payout. 60 The
sooner the attorney settles the case, the sooner he receives his
paycheck. 61 Extending the case, and thereby increasing the
amount each individual class member could recover, may actu-
ally be detrimental to the attorney's interests as it will involve
more work and more time on his part for only a small increase in
the amount he will eventually receive. 62 The perversion of the
contingency fee within the class action context lies within these
dueling interests. The attorney wants to maximize the plaintiffs
recovery because in doing so he is simultaneously maximizing his
58 Id. (noting that a contingent fee usually calls for larger compensation to be paid than
the attorney would normally charge)
59 See Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolvability": A New Approach to Regu-
lating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1015 (2005) ("A standard critique of class ac-
tions is that lawyers who act as agents for the class have financial incentives to negotiate
settlements that prioritize their own interests at the expense of class members' inter-
ests."); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 17-18 (explaining that contingency fees
give attorneys too much of a vested interest in the ongoing litigation).
60 See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[A] juicy bird in the
hand is worth more than the vision of a much larger one in the bush."); see also Macey &
Miller, supra note 1, at 18 ("[The attorney has an incentive] to settle early for a lower
amount than the attorney could obtain for the client by putting more time and effort into
the case.").
61 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loy-
alty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 390-91 (2000) [hereinafter Cof-
fee, Class Action] ("Given this financial outlay and the significant opportunity cost that
the litigation represents to them, plaintiffs' attorneys are unlikely to be as risk neutral in
their approach to the litigation as the average class member can be."); see also Macey &
Miller, supra note 1, at 25 ("Attorneys compensated on a percentage method have an in-
centive to settle early for an amount lower than what might be obtained by further ef-
forts.").
62 See Erbsen, supra note 59, at 1015n.34 (stating that class counsel may "conclude that
the risk of holding out for a better deal for their clients is not worth putting the certainty
of their own fee in jeopardy"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 17 (explaining that
"the contingent fee also gives the attorney an incentive to pay insufficient attention to
cases where the marginal return to the attorney's time is low relative to other cases in the
attorney's profile").
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own recovery; however, he also wants to get in and out, settling
quickly and receiving an early payday. 63
These fee arrangements have faced harsh criticism because
they give the attorney an economic interest in the case often ad-
verse to the interests of his client. 64 Additionally, contingency fee
agreements also have negative consequences in that they can
create an incentive for an attorney to pay insufficient attention to
other cases. 65 For example, if an attorney is handling multiple
cases, all with contingency fee agreements, he will have more of a
motivation to aggressively handle cases from which he stands to
gain the most, letting those cases that promise smaller payouts
to fall by the wayside.66 Finally, by intrinsically tying the attor-
ney's paycheck to the outcome of the case, there is a blurring of
the ethical lines, once again forcing the attorney in the shoes of a
businessman and not an advocate, weighing in his own mind
when to settle to maximize his possible investment.67 This clash
of the attorney and client interests raises questions as to who is
truly the adversary in such cases. 68 The plaintiff in the class ac-
63 See Coffee, Class Action, supra note 61, at 391 (noting that "because the fee award
does not increase proportionately with the recovery ... [i]t is simply unrealistic to expect
the attorney to accept additional risk without the prospect of commensurate return"); see
also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 17-18 (summarizing the attorney's rationale for con-
tingency fee standards in class actions).
64 See Coffee, Class Action, supra note 61, at 371-72 ("[The more standard depiction is
as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of opportunistic actions and often willing to sub-
ordinate the interests of class members to the attorney's own economic self-interest."); see
generally Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 17-18 (discussing the attorney fee structures).
65 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 20 ('These collective action and free-rider effects
[of class action suits] allow the plaintiffs attorney in class and derivative cases to operate
with nearly total freedom from traditional forms of client monitoring."); see generally Les-
ter Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without The Prince Of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1989) (discussing the attorney practice of implementing
contingency fee basis and the problems associated with it).
66 See Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting the apparent conflict
of interest between attorneys and clients for attorneys fees in class action suits); see also
Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing that "[tihe principal losers are members of
the plaintiff class who must pay over part of their recovery to counsel for work that serves
no purpose other than to justify an enhanced attorney's fee").
67 See Elihu Inselbuch, Complex Litigation at the Millennium: Contingent Fees and Tort
Reform: A Reassessment and Reality Check, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 175, 175 (1978)
(discussing the conflicting views about contingent fees); see also Macey & Miller, supra
note 1, at 25-26 (chronicling the problems of attorney's interest to reach settlement); see
generally Coffee, Understanding, supra note 15 (analyzing the difference between the pri-
vate and social incentives to litigate in light of the fact that the attorney's interests typi-
cally control class action suits).
68 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 8 ("[A]ttorneys are not subject to monitoring by
their putative clients, they operate largely according to their own self-interest, subject
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tion can actually be said to be fighting two battles in the court-
room. The external one against the defendant who has wronged
him, and a silent, less obvious battle against his own attorney,
who wants nothing more than to settle early, receive his pay-
check, and avoid litigation.
The most obvious answer to such criticisms can be found in the
rules of ethics. According to Model Rule 1.8, an attorney is pro-
hibited from representing a client if his own interests will impair
his ability to advocate zealously on behalf of his own client.69 This
would seem to disqualify a attorney from going forward with le-
gal representation if he did not feel able to detach himself from
his vested interest in the case and continue to advocate zealously
on behalf of his client.70 That being said, this is not an ideal
world and an attorney who seeks to represent clients solely for
his own financial gain will likely not be deterred by ethical rules
barring him from such representation. Thus, it becomes neces-
sary to determine if there are any implicit advantages to the con-
tingency fee arrangement that override the potential draw-
backs.71
While it may be easy to characterize contingency fees as im-
moral, such arrangements allow litigants into court even when
they cannot afford to hire an attorney. 72 This becomes increas-
ingly relevant in the context of the class action lawsuit, where an
individual plaintiff rarely has the money to fund the entirety of
only to whatever constraints might be imposed by bar discipline, judicial oversight, and
their own sense of ethics and fiduciary responsibilities."). See generally Judith Resnik,
Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, The Institute Of Judicial Administration Re-
search Conference On Class Actions: Aggregation And Individual Justice: Individuals
Within The Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296
(1996) (noting attorney's role in class action suits regarding fees and settlements).
69 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2002) (promulgating attorney's profes-
sional responsibilities).
70 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt (2003) (noting in relevant part "[a]
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 18
(stating that the attorney is ethically obligated to zealously advocate client's interest).
71 See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 253 (1998) (noting
that some view contingent fee arrangements to be contrary to public good); see also Macey
& Miller, supra note 1, at 17 (pointing out pros and cons of contingent fee arrangements).
12 See Major's Ex'r v. Gibson, 1855 Va. LEXIS 70, at *61 (Va. 1855) (holding that con-
tingent fee arrangements "constituted a better guaranty of fidelity" than fee certain ar-
rangements); see also Karsten, supra note 71, at 242 (stating that contingent fee ar-
rangements allow many poor people to bring their claims to court).
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the suit.73 Perhaps even more importantly within the class action
context is the notion that often any individual plaintiff stands to
gain only a nominal amount from the outcome of the suit and
therefore has no economic incentive to fund the suit himself.74
Contingency fees therefore serve the dual purpose of allowing
both the individual who cannot afford to litigate and the individ-
ual who would not have an economic incentive to litigate, into the
courtroom. Given that our judicial system is based on the notion
that every person deserves his day in court, one could classify
contingency fees as the ultimate proponent of this system.7 5 Not
only do such arrangements allow litigants into the courtroom re-
gardless of their income, but they also serve to ensure that more
suits are brought to the courtroom. 76 Though crowded dockets
and overworked judges are certainly not a fortunate consequence
of increased litigation, they are illustrative of the fact people are
being given access to the courtroom and those that caused the in-
juries are not walking away unscathed. 7
73 See JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law,
and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 758 (2004) (stating that class actions allow
for small claims to be litigated); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 8 (pointing out
benefits of class action suits when there are many injured persons but injury to any par-
ticular individual is small).
74 See Lind, supra note 73, at 758 (pointing out that consolidating claim into class ac-
tion suit allows plaintiffs to attract attorneys to represent plaintiffs' claim); see also
Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (indicating that while overall claims may be large, in-
dividual awards are small).
75 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (enumerating powers of judicial branch); see also
Rima N. Daniels, Monetary Damages in Mandatory Classes: When Should Opt-Out Rights
Be Allowed?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 499, 516 (2005) (recognizing utility of class action suits in
providing individuals ability to bring claims). See generally Karsten, supra note 71, at 241
(indicating that contingent fee arrangements are sole means for a poor person's rights to
be enforced).
76 See Karsten, supra note 71, at 239-40 (pointing out that fear of increasing number of
lawsuits resulting from contingent fee arrangements has come to fruition and has actu-
ally become acceptable); see also Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal
Options: Opting to Exploit Ourselves and What We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63,
103 (2003) (implying that contingent fee arrangements lead to more suits since such ar-
rangements provide avenue for poor to attain counsel).
77 The idea of the class action as a tacit check on businesses and as a means to ensure
that a guilty party does not go unpunished simply because he has not injured someone in
a truly egregious manner is addressed in section IV of this note.
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C. Agency Theory
Another major criticism of the class action is that class action
attorneys lack an actual client to constrain them.78 In traditional
forms of litigation, the attorney advocates on behalf of the client,
but it is the client who makes the ultimate decisions regarding
the representation. 79 In such a scenario, the client can be seen as
a monitor, ensuring the attorney engages in his legal duties to
the best of his abilities and is not sidetracked by any personal in-
terest he has riding on the litigation.80 Even in a contingency fee
representation, the client can tell the attorney to reject settle-
ment offers in favor of waiting out a higher offer or continuing on
to litigation.8 1 Such a relationship does not exist within the class
action context.8 2 In such litigation, attorneys do not have a single
client to whom they must answer.8 3 In fact, the client in class ac-
tion litigation is an amorphous group and the attorney is ulti-
mately responsible to the group as a whole, not to any individual
member.8 4 Without a specific client to keep him in check, the ex-
78 See Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation: The Funda-
mental Issues: Participants: The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective Institutional
Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 562-63 (1996) (suggesting that only
individuals with rather large claims in class actions have incentive to monitor attorney
activity); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (describing role of attorney in class
action suits as opposed to role of attorney in other forms of litigation).
79 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining how plaintiffs attorney functions
in traditional forms of litigation); see also Elliott J. Weiss, The Impact to Date of the Lead
Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 561,
561 (1997) (discussing legislation that has been passed for purpose of giving more control
of class action litigation to clients).
80 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (indicating that client monitoring serves as
check to attorney's actions); see also Weiss, supra note 79, at 563 (pointing out that even
in class action suits there are processes to monitor attorney activity).
81 See Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973) (announc-
ing that "parties normally have a real voice in the strategy and management of the litiga-
tion"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the attorney "is an agent of
the client and subject to the client's control in all important matters").
82 See Greenfield, 483 F.2d at 832n.9 (stating that in class actions the counsel directs
and manages the actions not the named parties); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at
3 (positing that the class action attorney does not "fit this mold," and is "subject to only
minimal monitoring by their ostensible 'clients,' who are ... dispersed and disorganized").
83 See Greenfield, 483 F.2d at 832 (illustrating the responsibility of class action counsel
to multiple persons); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (maintaining that client
in the class action suit is not an individual but a named group).
84 See Greenfield, 483 F.2d at 832 (explaining that the counsel for the class has fiduci-
ary obligations to many parties not before the court); see also Macey & Miller, supra note
1, at 3 (arguing that the lack of a definitive client gives the attorney the ability to exercise
extensive control over decisions that arise within the litigation context).
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istence of the entrepreneurial attorney has emerged.85 Such an
attorney exists to further his own self-interests as opposed to fur-
thering the interests of his client.8 6
Traditional agency theory describes the agency relationship as
"a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s))
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on
their behalf, which involves delegating some decision making au-
thority to the agent."8 7 Under such circumstances, if per chance
the interests of the two parties diverge, the monitoring by the
principal serves to keep the agent on track.88 The effectiveness of
this monitoring relationship ultimately depends on "the ob-
servability of the agent's performance."8 9 In the traditional attor-
ney client relationship, monitoring can be difficult because the
client (the principal) is often ignorant of litigable claims and de-
fenses, and therefore not always able to perform the necessary
supervisory functions. 90 Regardless of the difficult nature of the
task, the client is at least given the opportunity to observe his
agent at work and to assert his own opinions when he desires. 91
35 See Coffee, Rescuing, supra note 18, at 235-36 (stating that "entrepreneurial" private
attorneys predominate in class actions); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 7-8 (ex-
plaining that "[b]ecause these attorneys are not subject to monitoring by their putative
clients, they operate largely according to their own self-interest, subject only to whatever
constraints might be imposed by bar discipline, judicial oversight, and their own sense of
ethics and fiduciary responsibilities").
- See Coffee, Rescuing, supra note 18, at 235-36 (claiming that entrepreneurial attor-
neys are all "engaged in a race to claim the prize"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1,
at 7-8 (stating that because of lack of monitoring, attorneys operate "according to their
own self interest").
87 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (defining an
agency relationship).
88 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 87, at 308 (indicating that monitoring limits the
"aberrant activities of the agent"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 13 (stating
that "the interests of the agent are likely to deviate from those of the principal").
89 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 13-14 (asserting this in an analysis of the monitor-
ing of agents).
- See Brunet, supra note 15, at 405-06 (explaining the entrepreneurial incentives of at-
torneys who specialize in class actions transform attorney-client relationship into con-
verse connection in which attorney becomes principal and the unsophisticated client be-
comes the agent, with minimal ability to monitor the behavior of the class action counsel);
see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that much of the attorneys' activities
are outside the purview of the client).
91 See Edward R. Becker, Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel,
74 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 705 (2001) (finding that an individual client's stake in the outcome
of the lawsuit motivates him to "choose counsel, agree to compensation, and monitor
counsel's conduct"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining that the client
can do a variety of things to assess his attorney).
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Within the class action context, the ideal of agency theory be-
comes even more strained.92
In large-scale small-claim litigation, the lack of a substantial
stake in the litigation serves to deter many from wanting to take
on the extra responsibility of serving as a litigation monitor. 93
Even when someone has agreed to be the named plaintiff, he of-
ten wants to lend no more than his name to a case in which he
stands to recover only a nominal amount.94 This creates a situa-
tion where someone who has been tasked with representing the
voice of the class fails to follow through with the responsibility,
again leaving the class attorney as the one driving the lawsuit. 95
Additionally, within the class action context, members of the
class are often unaware that they have a stake in the litigation
until the settlement has been reached and therefore never have a
chance to weigh in on the litigation strategy.96 Perhaps most dis-
turbing to an outsider is the fact that, even if someone (besides
the named plaintiff) wanted to assume a stronger role within a
class action litigation, it is the attorney's responsibility to advo-
cate for the best interests of the class as a whole, and not any one
92 See Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973) (describ-
ing the difficulties of attorney-monitoring in the class action situation); see also Macey &
Miller, supra note 1, at 19 (stating the difficulty of maintaining a regulatory system for
class actions because plaintiffs cannot monitor the attorneys).
93 See Zimmer Paper Prod., Inc. v. Berger, 758 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir 1985) (indicating that
although all plaintiffs may have to do is merely fill out a form upon winning a lawsuit in
order to get the funds they deserve, only approximately twelve percent of plaintiffs ever
fill out this form, suggesting that the minimal stake serves as a disincentive for much of
the class); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 19-20 (explaining how the small in-
vestment in the litigation creates a "free-rider" effect where people are deterred from serv-
ing as a litigation monitor because they would be forced to take a larger role in the litiga-
tion as opposed to sitting back and waiting for a settlement windfall).
94 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that costs of having named plaintiff
outweigh its benefits). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating that claims or defenses
by the named plaintiff must be the same or similar to the class).
95 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that "[tihe absence of client monitor-
ing raises the specter that the entrepreneurial attorney will serve her own interest at the
expense of the client."); but see N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103 (1998)
(discussing that once an attorney is interested in the litigation he should terminate repre-
senting the class).
96 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(3) (mandating that in order to be excluded from a class ac-
tion the plaintiff must opt out, and if the putative class members fails to opt out, he is in-
cluded in the class and bound by the eventual settlement); see also Macey & Miller, supra
note 1, at 20 (discussing that plaintiffs are generally unaware of their stake in the suit
until a settlement has been reached).
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individual. 97 Resultantly, the attorney could potentially refuse to
listen to a class member at will, if he feels the class member's
wishes conflict with the interests of the class as a whole.
Other problems can arise even when someone within the class
does attempt to embrace the role of litigation monitor. Often the
class representative becomes a sort of stand-in because there is
no way for an attorney to be answerable to an entire class. 98 He is
supposed to take on the responsibility of overseeing class counsel
and ensuring that all decisions made are in the best interests of
the class as a whole. 99 As discussed earlier, oftentimes this repre-
sentative wishes to lend nothing more than his name to the liti-
gation, but sometimes the class representative does embrace his
role and does try to weigh in on important decisions made within
the litigation context. 100 This however can create friction within
the remainder of the class. 10 1 If other class members do not agree
97 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that "even where an individual
class member is aware of pending litigation, it is far from clear that she could have much
influence on the class attorney because the attorney must act for the benefit of the class
as a whole and therefore is not obliged to follow the unilateral wishes of any individual
class member when those wishes deviate from the attorney's sense of optimal litigation
strategy"); see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (discussing the role class counsel plays in the
class action context, and that the class attorney "must fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class").
9s See Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the importance of
conferring with the named plaintiff over litigation decisions); see also Mark C. Weber,
Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L
REFORM 347, 388 (1988) (discussing that notice is not required for some class actions, but
a court may order notice if they deem it to be necessary).
99 See Saylor, 456 F.2d at 900 (discussing the importance of conferring with the named
plaintiff over litigation decisions); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 20 (stating
that "[e]ven where an individual class member is aware of pending litigation, it is far from
clear that she could have much influence on the class attorney because the attorney must
act for the benefit of the class as a whole and therefore is not obliged to follow the unilat-
eral wishes of any individual class member when those wishes deviate from the attorney's
sense of optimal litigation strategy").
100 See Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform is Not Enough: Assuring More Than Merely
"Adequate" Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 985 (2004) (discussing
that a court will ask class representative questions to try to decrease the chances of him
not taking responsibility); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 70-71 (highlighting
that "[a] representative plaintiff who is closely connected to the plaintiffs' attorney may
exercise undue influence on the attorney to induce her to settle for an inappropriately low
figure").
101 See Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974) (explicating that "[t]he usual rule
is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class[,] . . .the plaintiff must
pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit"); see
also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 70 (suggesting that representative plaintiff is likely
to be more risk averse because he will have to pay the cost of litigation should the class
lose).
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with the decisions that the class representative is making and
feel that he is not serving his role effectively, they can be left
with little recourse, especially when other members of the class
do not feel the same way. While class members could potentially
opt out of a settlement with which they do not agree, this second
chance at opting out of the litigation is not a guarantee and in
fact can be granted only with judicial approval. 10 2 Additionally,
the unhappy class members could potentially move to remove the
class representative, but that again requires judicial intervention
and is not a guarantee, especially if other members of the class
do not feel that the representative is performing his duties
poorly. 10 3 As a result, class members who are unhappy with the
class representative could potentially become bound by a litiga-
tion with which they do not agree and in which they feel their
rights are not being adequately represented. 10 4
If the class representative decides not to wield control in the
action, it is undeniable that a lack of monitoring will result and
this will give the attorney a certain amount of leeway to litigate
the ongoing case in any way he sees fit. 105 The question then
arises as to who is most fit to run a class action lawsuit. In an
individual litigation, it is the client who drives the suit, as he is
the only one who has been injured and therefore the only one (be-
sides the attorney) that stands to gain from an eventual recov-
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (mandating that in order to be excluded from a class action
the plaintiff must opt out, and if the putative class members fails to opt out, he is included
in the class and bound by the eventual settlement); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) (ex-
plaining that under a Rule 23(b)(3) action, "the court may refuse to approve settlement
unless it affords new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members who
had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so").
103 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) noting that class representative will be continually scrutinized
by court).
104 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (mandating that in order to be excluded from a class ac-
tion the plaintiff must opt out, and if the putative class members fails to opt out, he is in-
cluded in the class and bound by the eventual settlement); see also Macey & Miller, supra
note 1, at 62-63 (stating that a class representative will often not adequately represent
absent parties, and even when they can perverse outcomes are still frequent).
105 See Zimmer Paper Prod., Inc. v. Berger, 758 F.2d 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (showing
that lack of client involvement can be seen in the response rate to class action notices and
that even following notices of settlement, there is only a twelve percent response rate); see
also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 70-71 (noting that when plaintiffs representative
does not monitor counsel, counsel is free to act in his own favor and in either event, "the
notion that the representative plaintiff exercises any significant leverage over the plain-
tiffs' attorney is dubious at best").
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ery. 10 6 In class action litigation, it is a group whose interests are
at stake, and the group as a whole will be affected by the even-
tual settlement. 107 Even in large-scale, small-claim litigation,
each class member has the potential to suffer a reduced settle-
ment fee if rash and uninformed decisions are made.108 With this
in mind, it seems nonsensical to allow an individual member to
inform the decisions of the class as a whole. In fact, with the at-
torney as the guide, the fact that he has a vested interest in the
outcome could even serve to increase the eventual settlement. 10 9
After all, he too will be paid out of the eventual recovery. 10 Al-
though the attorney may have an incentive to settle earlier to
maximize his own recovery, he too is looking for a positive out-
come. Arguably, in some perverse way, this aligning the attor-
neys' interests with the interests of the class (in terms of wanting
a recovery) actually forces the attorney himself to serve the pro-
tective function that a monitor plays in other forms of litiga-
tion."' The idea that there is no monitor in a class action suit is
106 See Coffee, Understanding, supra note 15, at 677 (1986) (noting in relevant part that
"a fundamental premise of American legal ethics is that clients, not their attorneys,
should define litigation objectives."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.2(a)
(2004) (discussing how control is generally allocated between client and attorney).
107 See Amchem Products v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997) (describing how con-
flicts of interest can affect settlement goals); see also Curry, supra note 11, at 398-99 (not-
ing that plaintiffs attorney must "seek to protect the best interests of the class as a
whole").
108 See Curry, supra note 11, at 397 (describing one potential source of conflict as an at-
torney's desire to settle and receive his fees rather than finish litigation, which might be
in plaintiffs' best interests); but see James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues
Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 933-34
(1996) (noting that there is speculation that Plaintiffs in Jiffy Lube class action received
much larger settlement by settling quickly).
109 See Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of
Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 69 (2004) (discussing one benefit to having
attorneys auction for each class action suit as aligning their interests to that of clients
because they are awarded on a contingent-fee basis); but see Christopher R. Leslie, A
Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action
Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1042 (2002) (noting that attorneys generally have "high
incentive[s] to settle" because it maximizes any return based on amount of time spent and
because without settling, attorney may not get paid at all).
110 See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1213 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that attor-
neys fees were fair and reasonable even though awarded out of settlement); see also Craig
Salner, The Basics of Attorneys' Fees in Class Action Cases, 25 No. 4 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 25,
25 (2006) (noting one common method of paying class action attorney fees is from settle-
ment award).
111 See Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees For Class Action Plaintiffs'
Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 BUS.
LAW. 763, 771 (1999) (noting that contingency fees are often the better method of compen-
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thus shortsighted. While the attorney may not be the agent for a
specific individual, he plays the agent for the entire group. Given
that a large settlement is both in his interest and in the interests
of the class as a whole, a system of self-monitoring comes into be-
ing. Therefore, the monitor within the class action suit is not an
individual, nor is it the class as a whole. 112 Such an arrangement
would be futile as class action suits are often anonymous and in-
volve individual plaintiffs with a small stake in the outcome. 113
The attorney is the one with the greatest stake in the litigation,
and is therefore the one who is best suited to serve as his own
monitor, keeping himself in check." 4
Additionally, the court itself serves as a check on the adequacy
and fairness of any outcome in a class action case.1 5 Of course, as
with all types of litigation, if the case goes to trial it is the judge's
or jury's duty to render an impartial verdict and award damages
as seen fit. 1 6 Most cases, however, do settle--both within the
sating attorneys when client is not available to monitor attorney's activities because it
best aligns attorney's interest with that of clients); see also Robert E. Litan & Steven C.
Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship Through Alternative Billing Methods, 77
JUDICATURE 191, 194 (1994) (stating that one method of compensating attorneys is
through a contingency fee, which "makes the attorney the economic equivalent of a part-
ner with his or her client in litigation").
112 See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 173-74 (1997) (noting that plaintiffs lack both ability and desire
to monitor an attorney due to expense involved and lack of having to pay attorneys re-
gardless win or lose); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 19-20 (describing the lack
of an appropriate monitor within class action context).
113 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 19-20 (stating "[m]embers of the plaintiff class
in a large class action or shareholder's derivative suit often have claims so small that the
litigation is a matter of relative unimportance to them . . . no rational plaintiff would
take on the role of litigation monitor"); see e.g., Zimmer Paper Prod., Inc. v. Berger, 758
F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that only twelve percent response rate of the plaintiff
class after notice of settlement was given).
114 See Roth, supra note 41, at 967 (explaining that lawyers often stand to gain more
from class action suits than the individual victims and that accounts for their presence
following mass disasters); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 461, 470 (2000) (discussing the fact that "in virtually every class action seeking
money damages, the person with the most at stake financially is the attorney represent-
ing the class").
115 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C) (explaining the court may approve final resolution of a
class action only after a hearing and finding that the final resolution of the case was fair,
reasonable, and adequate).
116 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Vanessa H. Eisemann, Striking a Balance of
Fairness: Sexual Orientation and Voir Dire, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 13 (2001) (noting
that "[a]lthough jurors may harbor unconscious bias ... they may be more cognizant of
their duty to render an impartial verdict after affirming to the court their professed abil-
ity to do so").
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class action context and within the context of litigation in gen-
eral. 117 Within the class action context there is the strange anom-
aly of the contingency fee actually pitting the interests of the cli-
ent against those of the attorney. 118 And while both attorney and
client want to maximize their individual recoveries, sometimes
ending the litigation earlier maximizes the recovery for the at-
torney without having the same effect for the class. 119 The Fed-
eral Rules provide a check on this potential problem, by creating
an agent for the class action to keep the attorney in check. 120 Ad-
ditionally, before a settlement in a class action can be approved
there must be a fairness hearing before the court. 121 Such a hear-
ing ensures that the settlement is truly in the best interest of the
class, and not just in the best interest of the class' attorney.122
Through the fairness hearing, the court itself has the responsibil-
117 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle'" Judicial Promotion and Regu-
lation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994) ("The fact that litigation ends in
settlement in the vast majority of cases may lead one to conclude that settlement is the
"preferred" alternative to going to trial."); see also Irvin W. Sandman et al., Should Bank-
ruptcy Lawyers Resist Mediation?, 14-5 A.B.I. J. 26 (1995) ("Most cases settle. Settlement,
not a court decision, is usually the final product in our adversary system. Traditionally,
settlement has been the by-product of litigation.").
118 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 55, at 534 (stating that "[nlumerous conflicts
of interest exist between lawyer and client, many of them economic in nature"); see also
Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 17-18 (stating "the contingent fee also gives the attorney
an incentive to pay insufficient attention to cases where the marginal return to the attor-
ney's time is low relative to other cases in the attorney's portfolio").
119 See Coffee, Class Action, supra note 61, at 390-91 (illustrating that "[g]iven this fi-
nancial outlay and the significant opportunity cost that the litigation represents to them,
plaintiffs' attorneys are unlikely to be as risk neutral in their approach to the litigation as
the average class member can be"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 17-18 (stat-
ing "the contingent fee also gives the attorney an incentive ... to settle early for a lower
amount than the attorney could obtain for the client by putting more time and effort into
the case").
120 See FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring class representative fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class).
121 FED R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) (stating the court may approve a settlement only after a
hearing).
122 See FED R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) (requiring finding that resolution of class action was
fair, reasonable, and adequate at the fairness hearing); see also Peter-Christian Olivo, No
More Times Tables: Risk Multipliers in Attorneys' Fee Awards After In Re Bolar Pharma-
ceutical Co., 77 MINN. L. REV. 893, 922n.138 (1993) (explaining that "[o]ften, the class
would be better served by an equitable remedy rather than a damage remedy[;] . . . [i]n
these cases, the class attorney should forgo the lure of the settlement enhancement and
concentrate on the interests of her clients").
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ity of ensuring honesty in the action and fairness in the overall
settlement.123
II. SAFEGUARDS
The previous section responded to the most common criticisms
of the class action and described the ways in which such negative
perspectives may in fact be advantageous within the greater
scheme of the legal system. This section shifts the focus and re-
sponds to criticisms of the class action by exploring a few of the
safeguards built into the system which prevent truly extortionate
law suits from making their way into the courtroom. 124 Perhaps
the best response to criticisms of the class action lawsuit lies
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves. 25
These rules were developed and amended over time to specifi-
cally combat the problem of allowing frivolous litigation into the
court system.1 26
123 See FED R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C) (requiring finding that resolution of class action was
fair, reasonable, and adequate); see also Ryan Kathleen Roth, Mass Tort Malignancy: In
the Search for a Cure, Courts Should Continue to Certify Mandatory, Settlement Only
Class Actions, 79 B.U. L. REV. 577, 584 (1999) (noting that "[m]inimum procedural due
process requires that class members not only receive adequate notice, but also have an
opportunity to participate in a fairness hearing, which results in a substantially higher
likelihood of an accurate result").
124 Note that many other safeguards exist both within the rules and elsewhere for pre-
venting extortionate claims from making it to the courtroom. For example, other safe-
guards exist within the notice requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) which demand that "the court
must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances," and in
Rule 23(e)(1)(A) which mandates that court approval is mandatory for the "settlement,
voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class."
See FED R. CIV. P. 23. An examination of all of these safeguards is beyond the scope of this
note.
125 See e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (describing necessary elements of a class action lawsuit,
including those necessary for class certification); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (imposing
sanctions for baseless lawsuits).
126 See Richard L. Marcus, Symposium of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Pro-
cedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 761, 787 (1993) (describing the constant pro-
gression of the federal rules as compelled by the standing committee on the civil rules as
well as courts); see also Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The
Present Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59
ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1179 (1996) (providing the example of increased likelihood of sanctions
as one way the rules were amended to decrease frivolous litigation).
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A. Rule 23(a): Class Certification
The first threshold that class actions must cross is Rule 23 it-
self and this rule serves as a means to separate baseless claims
from those that deserve to be litigated in a court of law.127 Under
Rule 23, a class action cannot be certified as such, unless the
class meets all four of the 23(a) prerequisites and one of the 23(b)
requirements. 128 This rule ensures that a class will not be certi-
fied and the litigation not allowed to continue unless: under
23(a)(1) "the class is so numerous that joinder of all the parties is
impracticable" 129 under 23(a)(2) "there are questions of law or
fact common to the class"130 under 23(a)(3) "the claims or de-
fenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class"' 31 and under 23(a)(4) "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class."
1 3 2
The certification process itself is both trying and time consum-
ing specifically because it has such a significant impact on the
overall outcome of the litigation. 133 At this stage, the court has
the ability to decide not only if the named plaintiff can ade-
quately represent the class, but also whether the case can pro-
ceed as a class action at all.134 By refusing to certify the class, the
judge may cause both the class action to be dropped and plain-
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (allowing for class certification only if the class meets the four
prerequisites under 23(a): numerousness, commonality, typicality and representativeness
and one of the 23(b) categorizations).
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
132 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
133 Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Holds that Denial of Class Certification Can Have Pre-
clusive Effect in State and Federal Courts, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2031
(2004) (explaining that "the modern class action is frequently won or lost at certification");
Carey M. Erhard, A Discussion of the Interlocutory Review of Class Certification Orders
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 151, 151-52 (2002) (positing
that "the grant or denial of a motion for class certification is undoubtedly a defining mo-
ment in any class action litigation" as it "marks the first pivotal point in litigation, and
often can be dispositive of its outcome").
134 Recent Case, supra note 133, at 2031 (noting judge's power to decide whether the
litigation can proceed as a class action and whether the named plaintiff can serve as the
class representative); Erhard, supra note 133, at 153 (stating that the final judgment rule
makes it very difficult for a party to obtain interlocutory relief for a class certification or-
der).
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tiffs to abandon their individual claims. 135 This is even more ap-
parent in cases where the individual claims are quite small and
it is only in the aggregate that the matter becomes worth litigat-
ing.136 Additionally, many defendants view the certification stage
as the penultimate stage in the litigation because as soon as the
class is certified they must begin paying-either in the form of
litigation fees or in the form of settlement offers. 37 Given the
enormous costs of litigation itself, it may often be in the defen-
dants' best interest to settle the case, regardless of the merits of
the underlying claim. 138
"The importance of the class certification determination was
recognized in the promulgation" of Rule 23(f) in 1998.139 This rule
permits parties to appeal a certification decision, at the discre-
tion of the court, prior to a final ruling on the merits of the
case. 140 Categories deemed appropriate for Rule 23(f) are those in
which the denial of certification "sounds the death knell of the
litigation, because the representative plaintiffs claim is too small
to justify the expense of litigation."'141 Also included in this cate-
135 Recent Case, supra note 133, at 2031 (commenting that "the court's decision to grant
or deny certification may determine not just how the litigation proceeds, but whether it
proceeds at all"); see Coopers v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978) (stating that denial of
class certification "may induce a plaintiff to abandon his individual claim").
136 See Erhard, supra note 133, at 158 (explaining that one of the concerns with the
class certification is the "death knell" situation and explaining that this is where the "de-
nial of class certification effectively ends the litigation because the individual plaintiffs do
not possess a large enough stake to litigate the claims individually"); see also John K. Ra-
biej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23 - What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV.
323, 365 (2005) (noting that a decision to deny certification is the "death knell" for actions
involving a large number of small claims).
137 See Erhard, supra note 133, at 158 (describing the situation of the "reverse death
knell" in which "an order granting class certification may force the defendant to settle
rather than defend the suit and risk potentially ruinous liability"); see also Amy Schmidt
Jones, The Use of Mandamus to Vacate Mass Exposure Tort Class Certification Orders, 72
N.Y.U.L. REV. 232, 260 (1997) (stating even when a defendant is faced with claims of du-
bious merit, the cost and compulsion to settle arises because of the desire to avoid liability
to a massive class).
138 Erhard, supra note 133, at 158 (citing the concerns founded on the "reverse death
knell"); see also Herbst v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1312 (2d Cir. 1974) (stat-
ing that "defendants in litigating class actions are likely to expend much money and time
in defending such actions because of the enormous damages sought by the representatives
of the class").
139 Erhard, supra note 133, at 152. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f).
140 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f); see Erhard, supra note 133, at 152 ("[Plarties aggrieved by a
district court's class certification determination [can be granted] an interlocutory appeal
at the absolute discretion of the circuit court.").
141 Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999).
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gory are those cases in which granting certification can "put con-
siderable pressure on the defendant to settle, even when the
plaintiffs probability of success on the merits is slight"142 thereby
causing a "mirror image of the death knell situation."' 43 In Blair
v. Equifax Check Services., Inc.,144 the court acknowledged the
importance of the certification decision and endorsed the 23(f)
ability to appeal that decision when certification or lack thereof
had systemic side effects that threatened to overwhelm the abil-
ity to litigate the merits of an underlying claim. 45
The weight ascribed to the class certification decision can also
be seen in the court's allowance of expert testimony to help in-
form that decision as exemplified by In re Visa Check/Master-
money Antitrust Litigation.46 In that case, plaintiffs alleged that
defendants had violated the Sherman Act and in response,
sought to certify a class consisting of "all persons and business
entities who [had] accepted Visa and/or MasterCard credit cards
and therefore are required to accept Visa Check and/or Master-
Money debit cards under the challenged tying arrangements."'' 47
Both sides submitted expert reports in support of their argu-
ments concerning certification. 148 The class was certified and
subsequently defendants appealed, maintaining that the district
court abused its discretion by finding that plaintiffs' expert re-
port was sufficient to support class certification. 49 In affirming
the district courts grant of certification, the court held that ex-
pert opinions can be persuasive in the determination of class cer-
tification. 50 This determination that expert opinions can be per-
142 Id.
143 Id. at 835.
144 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
145 See id. at 835 (finding that "when the stakes are large and the risk of settlement or
other disposition that does not reflect the merits of the claim is substantial, an appeal un-
der Rule 23(f) is in order").
146 280 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2001) (highlighting plaintiffs' submission of the report of
an expert witness with a Ph.D. in economics "in support of their motion for class certifica-
tion").147 Id. at 131.
148 Id. (stating that defendants also offered a report of an expert witness with a Ph.D. in
economics).
149 Id. at 131-32.
150 See id. at 134-35 (explaining that "[als for the defendants' claim that plaintiffs' ex-
pert evidence failed to provide a reliable basis for class certification, the district court's
finding that [plaintiffs expert witness'] methodology was not fatally flawed, and there-
fore, was sufficiently reliable for class certification purposes, does not constitute an abuse
of its discretion").
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suasive in informing the class certification decision demonstrates
the weight that courts ascribe to that decision. 151 Certification is
in fact given such weight that the court is willing to go outside
the facts of the case itself and review the opinions of experts in
the field to ensure that the decision is informed and is not made
under false auspices. 152
The importance of the certification decision both in the minds
of the parties involved in a class action and in the eyes of the
court itself has been reiterated time and again. 153 As a result, the
certification decision is often the most hotly litigated stage in the
class action process.15 4 Such contention stems from judicial rec-
ognition that although the certification decision is made at the
outset of the litigation, the consequences which can flow from the
decision can affect the overall disposition of the case. 155 The re-
sult is that certification decisions are carefully examined and
litigated before being approved.156 When the qualifications neces-
sary to certify a class are combined with the judicial recognition
that the certification decision has such a substantial impact on
the outcome of the case, the risk of a truly baseless lawsuit mak-
ing it through the certification process becomes minimal.1 57
i1 See id. at 131 (demonstrating how the court itself views certification as one of the
most important stages in the class action process); see also Erhard, supra note 133, at 151
(suggesting the "grant or denial of a motion for class certification" to be "undoubtedly a
defining moment in any class action litigation").
152 See In Re Visa, 280 F.3d at 131. The plaintiffs submitted an expert report in order to
support their motion for class certification. The district court denied the defendants' mo-
tion to strike the report. Id. A motion for class certification can be supported by expert
opinions. See DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 228 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D.N.Y 2005).
153 See Recent Case, supra note 133, at 2031 (stating that the modern class action is fre-
quently won or lost at certification); see also Erhard, supra note 133, at 151-52 (noting
that the grant or denial of a motion for class certification is a defining moment in any
class action litigation).
154 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (stating that a court of appeals may permit an appeal from an
order of a district court granting or denying class action certification); see Erhard, supra
note 133, at 151-52 (pointing out that the importance of the class certification determina-
tion was recognized in the promulgation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (f)).
155 See Coopers v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978) (holding that denial of certification
can have far-reaching side effects); see also Recent Case, supra note 133, at 2031 (explain-
ing the overwhelming significance of the certification decisions).
156 Coopers, 437 U.S. at 469n.12; Recent Case, supra note 131, at 2031.
157 Coopers, 437 U.S. at 469n.12; Recent Case, supra note 131, at 2031.
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B. Rule 11: Sanctions
If, however, a class did manage to be certified despite its base-
less nature, then the Federal Rules have another safety catch to
stop baseless claims from reaching the courtroom. 58 Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the imposition
of sanctions if a party brings a baseless lawsuit. 159 With the
dawning of the big case era in the 1960's, Rule 11 was strength-
ened through the imposition of mandatory, not discretionary
sanctions, as in the past. 60 This change was meant as a way in
which to ensure the integrity of the pleadings and thereby guar-
antee that only meaningful lawsuits would pass into the federal
court system. 16 1 Though the amendments sought sanction as a
panacea for what many perceived to be problems in federal litiga-
tion, specifically the disuse of Rule 11, it simultaneously caused
an "explosion of satellite litigation" as parties began to litigate
their Rule 11 claims postponing an examination of the actual
merits behind a case. 162 Thus, in 1993, the Rule was again
amended, and mandatory sanctions were replaced with discre-
tionary sanctions. 63 Additionally the parties were given a 21 day
158 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b) (providing that representations made to the court must be war-
ranted by existing law).
159 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) (explaining that "[b]y presenting to the court ... a pleading,
written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable in-
quiry under the circumstances--(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation"
and allowing for sanctions if 11(b) is violated); see Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Sanc-
tions for Non-Frivolous Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implications for the
Improper Purpose Prong of Rule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (1998) (providing a de-
tailed analysis of Rule 11).
160 See Kruzansky, supra note 159, at 1363-66 (tracing the history and evolution of Rule
11); see also Stephen R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, Article: Federal Rule 11: Are the
Federal District Courts Usurping the Disciplinary Function of the Bar?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
67, 73 (1997) (noting that "the 1983 amendments were intended to make the certification
requirement 'more stringent"').
161 See Kruzansky, supra note 159, at 1366 (explaining how the new version of Rule 11
helped to guarantee the integrity of court filings); see also Ripps & Drowatzky, supra note
160, at 73.
162 See Kruzansky, supra note 159, at 1366-67 (discussing the problems that mandatory
sanctions under Rule 11 introduced in the federal court system); see also Ripps & Dro-
watzky, supra note 160, at 78.
163 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c) (stating that the court may impose sanctions if violations of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) have been committed); see Kruzansky, supra note 159, at 1369 (stat-
ing that the transition from mandatory to wholly discretionary standards have, in some
cases, led to courts choosing to forego sanctions even if Rule 11 has clearly been violated).
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safe harbor during which they could withdraw the offending
pleading and escape repercussions. 164 Despite its many incarna-
tions, the main thrust behind Rule 11 has not changed. 165 It cur-
rently, and has always existed for the purpose of policing law-
suits introduced into the system and ensuring that meritless
claims do not reach the court room.1 66
Given the purpose behind Rule 11, it seems unlikely that a
truly extortionate class action lawsuit would survive the Rule 11
test.1 67 Under Rule 11, an attorney is required to do competent
research before making the decision to litigate a case. 168 If he
fails to perform his duties adequately, and therefore continues to
advocate on behalf of a meritless claim, he is exposing himself,
his firm and his client to potential sanctions.1 69 It follows there-
fore, that before a lawyer makes the decision to bring a class ac-
tion to the court room he will research the underlying claims to
ensure their validity.170 This duty is magnified in the class action
context because in such actions the defendant often stands to lose
a huge amount of money and will therefore be closely examining
164 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A); see Kruzansky, supra note 159, at 1369 (explaining the
safe harbor provision).
165 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (showing Rule 11 in its entirety); Kruzansky, supra note 159, at
1368-69 (quoting that "[t]hough the 1993 version of Rule 11 is worded some what differ-
ently than its predecessor, the Rule retains the two essential requirements ... (1) a filing
may not be presented for an improper purpose, and (2) all claims or defenses raised must
be warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for change").
166 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (showing how meritless claims do not get to be litigated);
Kruzansky, supra note 159, at 1369 (stating its two essential requirements that "(1) a fil-
ing may not be presented for an improper purpose, and (2) all claims or defenses raised
must be warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for change").
167 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b); see Marguerite L. Butler, Rule 11-Sanctions and a Lawyer's
Failure To Conduct Competent Legal Research, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 681-82 (2002) (ex-
plaining responsibility of courts to impose sanctions when lawyers offend Rule 11).
166 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (positing that representations made to court have to be formed
after reasonable inquiry); see Butler, supra note 167, at 690 (emphasizing that it is "the
attorney's obligation to conduct competent legal research").
169 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (stating some possible sanctions if lawyer fails to perform his
duties properly); Butler, supra note 167, at 692 (discussing sanctions imposed on lawyers
for failing to research law competently).
170 See Butler, supra note 167, at 690-92 (stating that before a lawyer brings claims
they have to conduct competent legal research in order to avoid sanctions for failing to do
so); see also Danielle Kie Hart, And The Chill Goes On--Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs
Beware: Rule 11 Vis-A-Vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and The Court's Inherent Power, 37 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 645, 672 (2004) (talking about how sanctions pose serious threats to attorneys
and guide their behavior).
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the merits of the claim himself.171 This is because if the defen-
dant is able to convince the court that the litigation is baseless,
then he can use the claim of sanctions to extricate himself from
potential liability.17 2 With this as the backdrop, in order for a
truly extortionate class action to make it into the court room (and
slip pass the Rule 11 sanctions test), the lawyer representing the
class would have to dupe not only the judge, but also opposing
counsel. 73 Since both judges and lawyers have a vested interest
in maintaining the integrity of the legal system and because law-
yers have a vested interest in winning their cases, it seems
highly unlikely that truly extortionate claims will be allowed to
slip by unnoticed into the courtroom.17 4
C. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
In 1995, "the 104th Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995" (PSLRA). 175 The Act "changed
171 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (setting the standards for merits of a claim); see also Macey &
Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (describing how overall liability can be large in class action liti-
gation); see also Charles Silver, 'We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and Black-
mail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1373 (2003) (talking about how in class action litigation de-
fendants will often settle for substantial amounts because class action suits create remote
risks of financial ruin).
172 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (maintaining that if claim is found to be baseless than it will
not be allowed to continue); see also Adam H. Bloomenstein, Developing Standards for the
Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 AKRON
L. REV. 289, 321 (1988) (quoting that when plaintiffs cannot plead their claims with req-
uisite particularity, in addition to dismissing these claims, "sanctions should be imposed,
unless the pleader can present the court with some reasonable justification for his filing
the claim").
173 See Beverly Dyer, A Genuine Ground In Summary Judgment for Rule 11, 99 YALE
L.J. 411, 428 (1989) (stating that it is difficult to determine whether meritless cases are
unreasonable); see also Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 IND. L.J. 651, 659
(1997) (stating that it is possible that some defendant might not know that claim against
them is meritless).
174 See Jeff Goland, In Re Penne & Edmonds: The Second Circuit Returns to a Subjective
Standard of Bad Faith for Imposing Post-Trial Sua Sponte Rule 11 Sanctions, 78 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 449, 487 (2004) (quoting that "[aittorneys' primary interest in litigation is
advancing the position of their clients [and t]he interest protected by Rule 11 is the integ-
rity of the legal process[; ... judges generally are in a better position to assess the impact
of questionable litigation conduct and have the responsibility to maintain the integrity of
the legal process"); see also Joseph C. Kopec, The Use of Rule 11 Sanctions and Prevailing
Party Fee-Shifting Statutes After Rule 41(a)(1)(i) Notice Dismissal, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1512, 1524 (1988) (stating that Rule 11 sanctions are helpful in deterring bad-faith litiga-
tion and in encouraging integrity).
175 Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative Develop-
ments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1023
(1998).
ST JOHN'S JO URNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
both substantive and procedural practice in class actions brought
under the federal securities laws" 176 and was "designed to pre-
vent abuses of federal securities class action lawsuits."177 Accord-
ing to Walker and Seymour, the principal features of the act in-
clude heightened pleading standards for the state of mind
requirements, a safe harbor for certain forward-looking state-
ments, a discovery stay while motions to dismiss are pending,
substantive and procedural requirements for securities class ac-
tion settlements, and lead plaintiff and notice provisions includ-
ing requirements that those seeking to be a lead plaintiff must
submit certification swearing that they did not purchase the se-
curity that is the subject of the complaint at the direction of
counsel or in order to participate in the action and that they will
not accept any payment for serving as a representative party on
behalf of the class. 178
By tightening the rules surrounding the certification of federal
securities class actions, the PSLRA is another device which en-
sures that only truly worthy claims make it past the initial
stages and develop into full fledged lawsuits. 179 The new re-
quirements which mandate that a plaintiff seeking to serve as a
class representative must essentially apply for the position create
a scenario where only someone who has truly been injured can
serve as the front man for the lawsuit. This has the effect of en-
suring that the rights of the class are adequately represented as
the lead plaintiff is someone who has truly been injured and not
simply someone glomming onto the suit in search of a potential
recovery. 180
176 Dumain, supra note 7, at 506.
177 Walker & Seymour, supra note 175, at 1023.
178 See Walker & Seymour, supra note 175, at 1023 (listing principle features of "the
most ambitious overhaul of the private securities litigation system ever undertaken"). See
generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §§§
101(a)2, 101(b), 102, 109 Stat. 737, 737-63 (1995).
179 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995). But see Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms, 30 CONN. L.
REV. 537 (1998) for the argument that these strictures "could dissuade many potential
plaintiffs and their council from pursuing actions and undermine the securities legisla-
tion's objectives." Id. at 552.
18o See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995); see also Eugene P. Caiola, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the
Uniform Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 315 (2000) (find-
ing that professional plaintiffs contributed to filings of frivolous lawsuits and failed to
adequately represent the class).
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While questions have been raised as to the effectiveness of the
PSLRA there are indications that the Act is in fact serving its
purpose of ridding the federal system of baseless class action
claims.181 Within the first seven months of the PSLRA's effectua-
tion, only forty class action lawsuits were initiated in federal
courts, whereas in previous years about 150 class actions were
filed within the first seven months of the year.18 2 Upon the first
anniversary of the PSLRA, data indicated that there was a de-
cline in the number of securities class actions filed in federal
courts from 1996 to 1995.183 The PSLRA is a finite example that
the federal rules do in fact serve their purpose of keeping frivo-
lous litigation out of the courtroom while still allowing for the
litigation of legitimate claims.
III. "CLASSY ACTIONS": THE OFT OVERLOOKED ADVANTAGES OF
THE CLASS ACTION
It is one thing to determine that the federal rules provide pro-
tection against the dissemination of truly extortionate lawsuits
and, argue that therefore, the class action should not be dis-
missed as legalized blackmail. These implicit protections aside,
however, the class action lawsuits themselves actually provide an
important service within the legal community.
A. Benefits to the Plaintiffs: Access to the Courts and Deterrence8 4
Historically it has been the plaintiffs who have supported and
utilized the class action. 8 5 The device is popular among injured
181 See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1725, July 31, 1996, at 9-10; see also Michael A.
Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913,
976 (2003) (stating the act significantly improved the quality of cases).
182 See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1725, July 31, 1996, at 9-10; but see Perino, supra
note 181, at 929 (indicating that the empirical evidence is mixed with some finding that
the class action filings have increased).
183 See John C. Coffee, Jr., First Anniversary: PSLRA of 1995, N.Y.L.J., Jan 30. 1997, at
5; see also Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon C. Mazumdar & Atulya Sarin, Empirical Analysis: Secu-
rities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2003) (finding that
between 1995 and 1996 the number of class action suits filed in federal court dropped
from 191 to 119).
184 This section will address the advantages of the plaintiff class action lawsuit only.
185 See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l. Bank v. Roper, 445 US 326, 338 (1980) (explaining that
"[the use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer sub-
stantial advantages for named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to bring cases that for
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plaintiffs because it allows them to pool their claims and bring an
action even when a single plaintiff alone has not sustained a sub-
stantial enough injury to warrant the underlying action.18 6 Simi-
larly the class action device gives plaintiffs a sort of strength in
numbers mentality.187 Alone, facing the big businesses of the
world can be daunting; and yet, as one in a group of injured
plaintiffs, this daunting task becomes more feasible.ss
In discussing the advantages of the class action for plaintiffs,
the easiest place to start is the notion within the American jus-
tice system of ensuring equal access to justice. 8 9 The American
legal system is heavily based on the philosophy that every in-
jured party deserves his day in court.1 90 It is with this objective in
mind that the class action becomes integral. 91 Often in the class
economic reasons might not be brought otherwise"); see also Richard C. Ausness, Retribu-
tion and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
KY. L.J. 1, 102 (1985) (finding that the class action benefits plaintiffs in several ways, in-
cluding access to damages and better lawyers).
186 See Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank, 445 US at 339 (enumerating advantages implicit
in class action lawsuits); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809
(1985) (noting that class action suits allow plaintiffs to pursue causes of action that oth-
erwise would not be economical).
187 See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Complex Litigation at the Millen-
nium: Beyond "It Just Ain't Worth It": Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Re-
form, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 137, 137 (2001) (holding that the class action can yield
significant social benefits like "providing compensation for modest but non-trivial losses .-.
• [and] allowing recovery for losses that cannot practically be achieved through individual
litigation"); see also Ausness, supra note 185, at 193 (stating that class action plaintiffs
can join their resources and spread the cost of litigation).
188 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137 (maintaining that the class action is a
useful device for plaintiffs to pool their claims and litigate together as a common entity);
see also Ausness, supra note 185, at 193 (stating that plaintiffs are able to afford better
lawyers when they combine their resources).
189 See Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Compara-
tive Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 683 (1997) (describing
"ensuring access to justice" as one of the tenets of the American legal system); see also N.
Lee Cooper, Sharpening Our Focus: The Association Proves Itself by Serving Members,
Protecting the Constitution, 82 A.B.A. J. 6 (1996) (listing "equal access to the courts" as
one of the central issues for the American Bar Association).
190 See Laura A Miles, Absolute Mediation Privilege: Promoting or Destroying Mediation
by Rewarding Sharp Practice and Driving Away Smart Lawyers?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV.
617, 641-42 (2004) (commenting that "[t]ort doctrine has evolved in recognition that an
injured party deserves to be made whole and the responsible party should bear the bur-
den"); see also Lee W. Rawles, The California Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable Judi-
cial Tool To Deny the Clever Obstructionists Access?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 275 (1998)
(noting that it is "axiomatic in our system of justice that every person is entitled to his
day in court").
191 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137 (stating that class action claims provide
remedies for "modest, but non-trivial losses"); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Indi-
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action scenario, a business or corporation has injured a large
number of people in such a way that the "overall liability is large
but the individual interests of the class members or corporate
shareholders are small."1 92 In such cases, it is only when the in-
jury is taken in the aggregate that it becomes worth litigating.193
The class action provides the mechanism by which the injured
plaintiffs can pool their claims, and in doing so create an action
that is worth pursuing.194
Additionally, the class action can be used as a means through
which to enforce the rights of the poor. 195 "When the plaintiff is
poor, marginalized, legally incompetent, ignorant of legal rights,
or unable to assert rights for fear of sanctions or otherwise, and
these disabilities are shared by others similarly situated, the
class action may be the only effective means to obtain judicial re-
lief."196 This ability to represent the poor becomes apparent in the
willingness of class action lawyers to represent classes on a con-
tingency fee basis. 197 Such a fee arrangement allows even indi-
gent parties to obtain a lawyer to vindicate their rights because
vidualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 977 (1993) (writing that class action claims allow indi-
vidual interests to be represented in court).
192 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3.
193 See id. at 3 (explaining how in "large-scale/small-claim" litigation the overall liability
is large, but individually the plaintiffs have not sustained significant damages); see also
Kerry Barnett, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96
YALE L.J. 1591, 1593 (1987) (stating that the class action was supposed to be the vehicle
to adjudicate individual claims).
194 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137 (describing the social benefits of class
actions in that they allow pooling of claims and therefore make litigation possible); see
also Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the
Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 10
(2005) (positing that class actions create better access to the courts).
195 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 10-11 (advocating the class action as the best
method to adjudicate individual claims of the poor); see also Marie A. Failinger & Larry
May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 15-17 (1984) (arguing that poor individuals' interest are best served by class action
claims and shared strategies).
196 Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 10-11 (quoting Lynn Pierce, Trend and Develop-
ment: Raising the Roof on Community Housing for People with Disabilities, 6 APPEAL 22
(2000)).
197 Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J. B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent
Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1152 (1970) (reasoning that a
contingent fee provides an incentive for attorneys and allows individuals to file claims
based on potential recovery); Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions,
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 348-49 (1998) (writing that class action contingent fees are char-
acterized by attorneys recovering fees when the class prevails and are proportional to the
recovery).
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they do not have to pay the attorney until they themselves re-
cover. 198
While access to the courts is undeniably important, some argue
that class action litigation is a waste of judicial time especially
when the parties have not sustained serious enough injuries to
bring individual actions. 199 These arguments fail to recognize the
benefits such litigation provides to the community as a whole and
not simply the benefits it provides to individual plaintiffs. 200 In
many ways the class action can eliminate power imbalances that
would otherwise exist in the face of such claims.20 1 Through the
class action, plaintiffs are able to pool their claims and thereby
increase the defendant's potential liability.20 2 Additionally, the
pooling of claims ensures that even small claims get litigated-
claims that would go un-litigated were it not for the class ac-
tion. 20 3 In fact, one of the reasons many big businesses and corpo-
rations oppose the class action so vehemently is because they are
aware that it would not be cost effective for many of the class ac-
tion claimants to pursue their claims without the benefit of the
198 Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 197, at 1152 (noting that clients are sometimes bet-
ter off under a contingency fee); see Alexander, supra note 197, at 352 (predicting that
class actions would not survive without contingency fees as plaintiffs may not have suffi-
cient funds during the litigation).
199 See Barnett, supra note 193, at 1591-92 (describing how courts have been reluctant
to certify classes, often leaving individual claims unresolved); see also Failinger & May,
supra note 195, at 17 (offering an example showing how poor plaintiffs may not recover
damages because there individual claims are minor).
200 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137-38 (maintaining that class actions can
deter injurious behavior); see also Coffee, supra note 18, at 218 (writing the point behind
class action litigation is not simply to provide compensation for injured victims, but is also
"to generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources committed to the
detection and prosecution of the prohibited behavior").
201 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 12-13 (reasoning that a class is more effective
at gaining the attention of a large, powerful defendant); see also Failinger & May, supra
note 195, at 17-18 (arguing that poor plaintiffs have increased clout when joined in a
class).
202 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 12-13 (explaining that a large class can hold a
defendant responsible for its actions through large judgments); see also Failinger & May,
supra note 195, at 17-18 (showing through an example that a class can provide effective
deterrence in addition to financial judgments).
203 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 11-12 (stating "[c]lass actions also enable
claims that may be economically and socially insignificant as individuals claims, but that
are far more significant as a whole, to be heard."); see also Failinger & May, supra note
195, at 17-18 (arguing that a class action is the best way to litigate a poor plaintiffs indi-
vidual claims).
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other members of the class.20 4 Therefore, without the class action
device, many businesses would arguably be able to escape an-
swering for their wrong-doings until they injured someone so
substantially that it became cost effective for the injured victim
to pursue the claim individually. 20 5
The use of the class action as a means to regulate businesses
and to force them to answer for their wrong-doings, no matter
how small, has given birth to the private attorney general. 20 6 The
private attorney general is someone who sues "to vindicate the
public interest."20 7 Lawyers who have deputized themselves as
private attorney generals serve a very important purpose within
the legal system.208 Such lawyers represent classes not only to
ensure that the victims are duly compensated, but also to deter
certain behavior within society at large. 209 By soliciting and rep-
204 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that in the absence of a class action
device, many injuries would go unremedied because individual plaintiffs would not them-
selves have a sufficient economic stake in the litigation to incur the litigation costs); see
also Allison Torres Burtka, Illinois High Court Strikes Down Class Arbitration Ban,
TRIAL, January 1, 2007, at 68 (reporting that the Illinois Supreme Court held class action
bans in arbitration clauses of cellular phone contracts to be unconscionable because they
prevent a cost-effective mechanism for individual customers to obtain a remedy).
205 See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems
and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 74-75 (2007) (suggesting that busi-
nesses, knowing that individuals are unlikely to mobilize, "may knowingly engage in ille-
gal conduct that causes dispersed injury, confident that it will not be held accountable");
see also Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Ac-
tions'" An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 824 (1995) (stating that "[w]hen a mil-
lion consumers have a ten dollar claim against a common defendant for an illegal busi-
ness practice, no single claimant has a legal right that is worth individual pursuit").
206 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 217-18 (stating that the role of private litigation in the
enforcement of law, together with the key institutions of the class action and the contin-
gent fee, gave rise to the modern private attorney general); see also Eric Helland, Reputa-
tional Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J. L. & ECON. 365,
365 (2006) (stating that "[t]he enforcement of the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities
law creates private attorneys general who enforce public law for private gain").
207 Coffee, supra note 18, at 216; see Assoc. Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc., v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) (stating that Congress may, by statute, confer authority on non-
official persons to bring legal action to "vindicate the public interest").
208 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 216 (commenting that "our society places extensive re-
liance upon such private attorney generals to enforce the federal antitrust and securities
laws, to challenge corporate self-dealing in derivative actions, and to protect a host of
other statutory policies"); see also Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-
Market Customers: Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common
Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 830 (2006) (stating that consumer protection statutes
encourage "private attorneys general to advance the public interest in a transparent, effi-
cient consumer marketplace").
209 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 218 (explaining that private attorney generals pursue
litigation as much to compensate victims as to serve as general deterrents); see also
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resenting injured claimants against larger businesses, these at-
torneys are increasing the resources allocated to the "detection
and prosecution of prohibited behaviors."210 This increase in re-
sources simultaneously increases the likelihood that a business
will be closely regulated and subsequently held accountable for
any illicit behavior.211
The benefits of the class action device to individual plaintiffs
are multi-faceted. First, the device allows plaintiffs to make
their way into the court- room even when they have been injured
only minimally. 212 This access to the courts not only allows more
claims to be litigated, but also causes businesses to be more
aware of their behavior. 213 As more claims are filtered into the
courtroom, it becomes more likely that a business will be forced
to answer for any injures it has caused.214 As plaintiffs' attorneys
deputize themselves as private attorney generals, they serve the
important purpose of supplementing the governmental regula-
tion of business, again deterring illicit behavior on the part of big
Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 589, 590 (2005) (stating that private attorneys general often request injunctive or
other equitable relief aimed at altering the practices of large institutions and that the im-
pact of such private attorney general litigation is rarely confined to the parties in a given
case).
210 Coffee, supra note 18, at 218; see Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137-38 (stating
that class actions can deter injurious behavior and supplement regulatory enforcement by
administrative agencies).
211 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 224-25 (stating that private attorneys general allow
public agencies to concentrate their resources on detection); see also Hensler & Rowe, su-
pra note 187, at 137 (stating that private attorneys general supplement the regulation
and enforcement by administrative agencies which may be under-funded, politically con-
strained, or influenced by the very entities they regulate).
212 See Leslie, supra note 205, at 75-76 (observing that the class action device allows
litigants to aggregate small claims and bring them on behalf of the class when the amount
at stake for an individual would not warrant filing suit); see also Hensler & Rowe, supra
note 187, at 137 (stating that damage class actions allow recovery for losses that cannot
practically be achieved through individual litigation, and thus supplement regulation and
enforcement by administrative agencies).
213 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 218 (suggesting that the role of the private attorney
general is not simply to secure compensation for victims but also to generate deterrence);
see also Morrison, supra note 209, at 590 (commenting that private attorneys general aim
is altering the practices of large institutions).
214 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 218 (suggesting that the increase in resources commit-
ted to detection and prosecution added by the efforts of private attorneys general increase
deterrence and enforcement); see also Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137 (stating
that damage class actions deter injurious behavior and supplement regulatory enforce-
ment).
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business. 215 This circle of regulation works to compensate and de-
ter, proving advantageous not only to the plaintiffs themselves,
but also to society as a whole, which benefits from the increased
regulation of the businesses world.216
B. Defendants and the Class Action
While historically, it was the plaintiffs that supported the class
action, recently there has been movement among defendants in
support of the device.21 7 This change is largely due to the growing
notion that the class action device can provide defendants with
some implicit protections as well.218 When a corporation or busi-
ness is named as a defendant in a class action, it means that it
has allegedly injured a large number of people in the same man-
ner. 219 Without the class action device, the defendant could po-
tentially face an individual lawsuit from each member of the
class. 220 Defendants have begun to support the class action be-
215 Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137-38 (stating that damage class actions deter
injurious behavior and supplement regulatory enforcement); Helland, supra note 206, at
367 (outlining how one major enforcement methods of federal securities laws are private
attorneys filing civil actions, which have the social utility of compensating victims and
deterring future violations).
216 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 194 at 13-14 (positing that "the mere possibility of a
class action lawsuit may encourage a government or private agency to change its behavior
without engaging in litigation"); see also Morrison, supra note 209, at 590 (suggesting that
"[flrom school desegregation to fair housing, environmental management to consumer
protection, the impact of the private attorney general litigation is rarely confined to the
parties in a given case").
217 See Anne Bloom, Access to Justice: The Economics of Civil Justice: From Justice to
Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class Action Crisis, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 747
(2006) (explaining Agent Orange litigation brought about shift to "place greater emphasis
on the economic need of class action defendants"); see also Francis E. McGovern, Class
Actions in the Gulf South Symposium: Class Actions and Social Issue Torts in the Gulf
South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1655, 1666-67 (2000) (describing thinking of defendants that class
action is only procedure available to save them from lawsuits filed around country).
218 See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980) (highlighting one
justification for class action is protection of defendant from contradictory obligations); see
also Bloom, supra note 217, at 745 (stating that today class action "focuses on judicial
economy and capping defendants' liability").
219 See Myron S. Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need to Know about
Class Actions: A Basic Primer, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 193 (2004) (discussing that class
action serve to resolve "a large number of similar claims"); see also David Rosenberg,
Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 393, 393-94 (2000) (noting defendants prepare one defense when faced with mass
tort claims because claims are common questions of liability and damages).
220 See Heather M. Johnson, Resolution of Mass Product Liability Litigation within the
Federal Rules: A Case for the Increased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2329, 2362-63 (1996) (stating "class certification provides the advantage of offering
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cause it means that a single litigation can bind a large number of
people, thereby allowing the defendant to insulate itself from fur-
ther liability.221
The advantages of the class action to defendants became even
more explicit following the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.222
The Act itself was actually spearheaded by defendants, who rec-
ognized the implicit advantages that the class action lent to de-
fendants. 223 Prior to the passage of the act, there was a tendency
among plaintiffs to bring actions in magnet courts, known to be
friendly to plaintiffs. 224 As plaintiffs filed in plaintiff friendly
state courts, they created a scenario where a single defendant
could potentially face multiple class actions pending in multiple
state courts at a single time. 225 This became hugely problematic
for defendants who were unable to settle class actions with a
universal deal. 226 Additionally, they had to foot the bill for the
ongoing litigation in each court, causing the actions to become
exorbitantly expensive and often forcing defendants to settle
defendants the opportunity to vindicate themselves in one suit, as opposed to defending
hundreds of individual suits"); see also Rosenberg, supra note 219, at 393-94 (observing
defendant, when confronted with many similar claims, prepares one defense and litigates
as "a de facto class action").
221 See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402-03 (explaining that justifications for class action "in-
clude the protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations ... [and] the provision
of a convenient and economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits"); see also John-
son, supra note 220, at 2363 (illustrating that an advantage to class action is that it al-
lows defendants to cap their liability in a single suit).
222 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
223 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28
U.S.C. 1711-1715, 1332, 1453 (2005)); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant's Obli-
gation to Ensure Adequate Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 511, 529
(2006) (highlighting that business community lobbied for Class Action Fairness Act).
224 See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C.L. REV. 333, 334-35 (2006) (de-
scribing strategy of forum shopping); see also Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The In-
adequate Search for 'Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998) (explaining that forum shopping was prevalent in class
action lawsuits).
225 See Bassett, supra note 224, at 337 (citing criticism of forum shopping); see also Todd
J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America's Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J.
1141, 1154-55 (2006) (expressing how easy it was for plaintiffs to choose the state they
wanted for a class action lawsuit).
226 See Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight- Year Saga Is Fi-
nally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 385 (2005) (describing problems with class action
lawsuit and why congress enacted Class Action Fairness Act); see also Charles Silver,
'We're Scared to Death':- Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357, 1373
(2003) (discussing Judge Posner's view that class action causes defendants to settle even
if they won twelve of thirteen trials).
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simply because they could not face the costs of the pending litiga-
tions. 227 Other problems arose as plaintiffs began to use defen-
dant's settlements in other ongoing litigations as leverage in
their own litigations. 228 While the plaintiffs liked the ability to
choose the forum to their advantage it became hugely problem-
atic for defendants and the judicial system as a whole. 229 The on-
slaught of multi-party, multi-jurisdictional lawsuits became a
millstone around the neck of the judicial system with identical
cases spanning and clogging both state and federal courts. 230
Therefore, the impetus behind the Class Action Fairness Act was
to find a way to consolidate all pending state actions before one
judge in federal court and to thereby assure fairer outcomes for
class members and defendants. 231
Prior to the Act, the diversity of the class was determined by
the citizenship of the representative party and not by the citizen-
ship of the class members as a whole. 232 Additionally, in the class
action context where diversity was the basis for subject matter
jurisdiction each plaintiff had to individually assert a claim that
exceeded $75,000.233 This necessity was reaffirmed in Zahn v. In-
227 See Andreeva, supra note 226, at 385 (noting that critics of class actions have in past
claimed "that plaintiffs' attorneys bring unsupported claims against innocent parties,
forcing them to settle rather than risk a large judgment"); see also Assaf Hamdani & Alon
Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 689-90 (2005) (highlighting that de-
fendants would rather settle than pay for costs of litigation).
228 See Andreeva, supra note 226, at 385 (discussing the court's power to reject a set-
tlement for wrongdoing); see also Paula Batt Wilson, Attorney Investment in Class Action
Litigation: The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. 291, 300-01 (1994) (noting lever-
age that plaintiffs attorneys get over defendants in class action lawsuit).
229 See Bassett, supra note 224, at 339 (explaining advantages of forum shopping); see
also Zywicki, supra note 225, at 1154 (describing "bad" forum shopping in class action
lawsuits).
230 See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2004) (discuss-
ing the enormity and complexity of an Antitrust litigation spanning some thirty-two fed-
eral courts where over one thousand opinions were rendered on over ten thousand sepa-
rate filings by at least one hundred law firms); cfAndreeva, supra note 227, at 385 (citing
criticisms of class actions).
231 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4 (codified
as note to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1711) (stating that the Act aims to "restore the intent of the
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance"); Id. at pmbl. (explaining that the Act amends
"procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions to assure fairer out-
comes for class members and defendants").
232 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (summarizing the state of diversity
rules at that time).
233 See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that each plaintiff in
class action lawsuit predicated on diversity jurisdiction must satisfy the jurisdictional
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ternational Paper Co., where the court held that the fact that the
class representative was asserting a claim of $75,000 was not
enough to sustain subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. 234
The Class Action Fairness Act created a system by which it be-
came much easier to consolidate actions in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction. 235 The Act mandates that, in class actions
only, where the basis of subject matter jurisdiction is diversity
there is a $5 million aggregate requirement.23 6 The difference be-
ing that the amount in controversy is now looked at in the aggre-
gate and individual claims are not relevant for determining ju-
risdiction.237 Additionally, the Act created a liberalization of the
diversity requirement called "minimal diversity. '238 Under the
new Act, if any class member, named or not, is diverse from any
one defendant then there is presumptive jurisdiction. 239
The Class Action Fairness Act has not only diminished the
ability of plaintiffs to bring suits in friendly courts, but has also
reinforced the notion that the class action can be useful to defen-
dants.240 If defendants are able to remove and consolidate pend-
ing state cases in federal court, they can deal with all of the cases
through a single disposition which will be binding on every mem-
amount); see also Fuller v. Exxon Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 n.13 (S.D.A. 1999) (cit-
ing Zahn and finding that subject matter jurisdiction requires that every class member's
claim must exceed $75,000).
234 See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
235 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C.A § 1711-15).
236 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 9 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332) (giving federal courts original jurisdiction "of any
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,
exclusive of interest and costs," and allowing aggregation of individual class members'
claims for purposes of determining whether the $5,000,000 requirement has been satis-
fied).
237 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 9 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332).
238 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 9 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332).
239 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4 , 9 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332).
240 See Edward A. Hosp, Settlements Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 67
ALA. LAW 124, 126 (2006) (discussing how the Class Action Fairness Act addressed specific
perceived abuses including the problem of "forum shopping" resulting in the creation of
"magnet" jurisdictions); see also Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework
for Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 621, 642
(2006) (noting Congress's intention to address the problem of forum shopping by savvy
class action lawyers).
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ber of every state class.241 As a result, a whole new litigation pa-
radigm has begun to develop. Instead of plaintiffs calling for
class actions, many more defendants have begun to push for class
certification, asking for the broadest possible definition of the
class so that a potential settlement will catch the largest number
of people within its net.2 42
The Act has leveled the playing field by eliminating the ability
of plaintiffs to forum shop for advantageous courts and has simi-
larly reduced the means by which plaintiffs can force defendants
to "litigate truly interstate class action lawsuits in state
courts. 2 43 By eliminating the ability of plaintiffs to forum shop
and to tie up defendants with multi-jurisdictional multi-state ac-
tions, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 has turned the class
action into a device that is both a cost effective and efficient
means by which a defendant can face an onslaught of claims from
multiple plaintiffs in a single forum. 244
241 See Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Plagued By Concerns Over Federalism,
Jurisdiction and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REV. 589, 595n.25 (2004) (illustrating class action
defendants' ability to remove pending state cases to the federal courts as long as such
cases satisfy, among other things, the minimal diversity requirement); see also Richard A.
Nagareda, Symposium, Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-Year Retrospective:
Panel Four: Class Action Fairness Act: Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1876 (2006) (ex-
plaining that the Act was established to facilitate removal of state law class actions to the
federal courts).
242 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 138 (noting financial incentives for defen-
dants who wish to "buy res judicata" by seeking out plaintiffs attorneys who are willing to
settle claims for less); see also Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action:
Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 38 (2006) (articulating how the Class Action Fairness Act addresses
the problem of class action leverage against large corporate defendants who oftentimes
settle frivolous lawsuits rather than litigating in order to save money, thus indicating
such defendants' interest in certifying the largest class possible in order to foreclose any
future litigation on the subject).
243 See Andreeva, supra note 226, at 394 (noting that "[p]roponents of the Act advocate
that many defendant businesses are forced to litigate truly interstate class action law-
suits in state courts"); see also Todd J. Zywicki, supra note 225, at 1154 (discussing forum
shopping in state class-action litigation and how problems created by "forum-shopping
competition" became so severe that Congress had to enact the Class Action Fairness Act
in order to remedy the problem).
244 See Nivine K. Zakhari, Is The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 a Misnomer? The
Impact on Class Action Waivers in Consumer ADR Clauses, 5 J. AM. ARB. 97, 104-05
(2006) (discussing how the Class Action Fairness Act has reduced requirements for defen-
dant's removal of cases into federal courts by allowing for claim aggregation to meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction and relaxing the diversity re-
quirement; all of which help the defendant deal with claims from multiple plaintiffs in a
single forum); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Symposium, The Class Action Counterre-
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of all the good that the class action lawsuit brings to
the courtroom, it becomes hard to reconcile the controversy sur-
rounding the use of such suits. And yet, there is still undeniably
something driving this very visceral reaction that so many in the
legal community and in the United States at large seem to have
toward such suits. While it is easy to cite the behavior of certain
litigious plaintiffs' attorneys as the motivation for this reaction,
such pointed blame falls short of reconciling the true apparent
dichotomy. In reality, the negativity surrounding the class action
is so pervasive that it cannot possibly be the sole fault of a subset
of attorneys. It seems something far more omnipresent is driving
the reaction surrounding the class action.
The class action is very different from other forms of litiga-
tion. 245 Within the class action context, the lawyer often solicits
the client, who may or may not know that he has been wronged
until approached by legal counsel.24"' The lawyer often represents
the client on a contingency fee basis, which pits the attorney's in-
terest against the interests of his own clients. 247 Further, within
the class action context, the lawyer represents an amorphous
class as a whole, not an individual plaintiff.248
formation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1479 (2005) (noting the utility of the class action to
"fairly, efficiently, and cost-effectively provide consistent and binding adjudication of
common, recurring questions of fact or law").
245 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3-4 (explaining that the class action is not of
the same ilk as other forms of litigation); see also Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 16
(2005) (noting several differences between class actions and other types of lawsuits).
246 See Williams v. Balcor Pension Investors, 150 F.R.D. 109, 118 (1993) (discussing how
class actions are "inevitably the child of the lawyer rather than the client" and in some
cases "lawyers find clients and precipitate cases where perhaps no one client would ever
come forward to complain"); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort
Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413,
434-35 (1999) (noting the view of class action lawsuits as lawyer-generated and lawyer-
driven litigation because the lawyer often solicits the class clients when the claimant did
not seek out legal advice on their own).
247 See Wilson, supra note 228, at 299 (noting that the client's and attorney's interest in
class action suits are not always identical, for example, when receiving a contingency fee
an attorney "may want to settle early for a guaranteed fee rather than invest additional
hours in the case"); see also Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 197, at 1152 (discussing
situations when a client's removed status in class action suits can sometimes lead to con-
flicts of interest, as when contingency fees are involved, a client may "want the lawyer to
stay close to the relatively safe minimum rather than risk getting nothing in an effort to
increase the settlement").
248 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that the client within the class ac-
tion context is the class and not any one individual); see also Martha Matthews, Ten
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Despite these implicit differences, the class action undoubtedly
serves an important function within the legal arena. 249 The class
action allows for the pooling of claims and thereby assures access
to the courts, even when no one person has been injured so sub-
stantially that it would be economically feasible to litigate a
claim individually. 250 In allowing such access to the courts, the
class action simultaneously ensures that businesses will be held
accountable for the injuries they inflict, even when those injuries
are not grievous in nature. 251 From the defendants' perspective,
the class action is beneficial, as it provides an efficient and cost-
effective means to dispense with numerous actions through a
single binding judgment. 25 2
Given the advantages of the class action as a lawsuit unto it-
self, it becomes hard to understand why there is so much negativ-
ity surrounding the use of such suits. Understandably, the class
action looks different from other forms of litigation. And yet, it
provides a forum for a very different kind of claim. In fact, these
claims would likely go un-litigated were it not for the device of
Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action
Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1437 (1996) (demonstrating that "[iln all class actions,
the lawyer must apply ethical norms premised on a single client with articulated interests
to the amorphous, conflicting, and indeterminate interests of a plaintiff class").
249 See Deposit Guar. Nat'l. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (describing one of
the advantages of the class action lawsuit as providing equal access to the courts); see also
Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 10 (stating that "[i]n the American legal system, the
class action serves multiple purposes").
250 See Ilana T. Buschkin, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Econ-
omy--Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S.
Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1588 (2005) ("By allowing claimants to pool re-
sources, the class action lawsuit lessens the burden on individual claimants, making it
more attractive to bring suits in the public interest."); see also Hensler & Rowe, supra
note 187, at 137 ("Class actions for damages can provide compensation for modest but
nontrivial losses suffered by widely dispersed but similarly positioned persons as a result
of the negligent or illegal behavior of others, allowing recovery for losses that cannot prac-
tically be achieved through individual litigation.").
251 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137 (noting that class actions can deter inju-
rious behavior); see also Andrei Greenawalt, Limiting Coercive Speech in Class Actions,
114 YALE L. J. 1953, 1971 (2005) (stating that class actions can deter companies and insti-
tutions that would otherwise not be sufficiently deterred and possibly motivate them to
"change their behavior under the threat of substantial damages from a class action law-
suit").
252 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137 (portraying that "class actions also may
provide efficient management and resolution of large numbers of similar claims"); see also
Blank & Zacks, supra note 194, at 10 (noting that class actions can protect the defendant
from inconsistent obligations and allow them to economically dispose of similar lawsuits).
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the class action.253 Perhaps then the problem is not with the class
action itself, but rather with the overarching view that such suits
are an offshoot of normal litigation practices. The class action
cannot be reconciled with the legal and ethical mandates sur-
rounding other forms of litigation. 254 Regardless, it does provide a
mechanism through which to adjudicate claims that would be
overlooked by more traditional litigation practices. The class ac-
tion is in fact, its own entity. It does not look like other forms of
litigation nor does it operate in a similar manner as these more
traditional forms of litigation.255 And yet, given the advantages of
the class action, 256 it is too integral a part of American legal sys-
tem to dismiss as nothing more than legalized blackmail.
Undoubtedly things that are new or different do make people
uncomfortable. And the class action falls squarely within this
categorization. Were it to look or function like other forms of liti-
gation than it might ease some of the criticism, but at the same
time it would be exchanging acceptance for utility.257 The reason
253See Buschkin, supra note 250, at 1588 (illustrating that "[w]ithout the class action
device, ordinary citizens would rarely bring these public law actions since the costs of liti-
gating a lawsuit would far outweigh any potential return"); see also Blank & Zacks, supra
note 194, at 10 (noting the class action as an outlet for groups who individually would be
ineffective in bringing their opponents into court at all).
254 See Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, (Practicing L.
Inst., Litig. and Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series), July, 2006, at 704 (discussing
ethical issues and how they arise frequently in class action litigation, including "conflicts
of interest, solicitation, application of the no-contact rule, the reasonableness of attorneys'
fees, and the attorney-witness rule"); see also Marc Z. Edell, Resolution of Mass Tort Liti-
gation: A Practitioner's Guide to Existing Methods and Emerging Trends, (A.L.I. - A.B.A.
Continuing Legal Educ., Products Liability), Aug. 19, 1994, at 54-57 (noting that class
actions usually require the "practitioner to reconcile potentially divergent interests," for
example, conflicts of interests or whether to accept a settlement).
255 See Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who Are the Real Winners?, 56
ME. L. REV. 223, 223 (2004) (commenting that class actions allow individuals to bring ac-
tions "that otherwise either would not be possible or would only be possible in a very dif-
ferent form"); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3-4 (discussing how class actions
are different from other forms of litigation and calling for regulatory reform).
256 See Locating Investment Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort
Class Action, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2665, 2666-67 (2004) [hereinafter Locating] (citing admin-
istrative efficiency as "the most prevalent benefit" associated with class action lawsuits
and suggesting optimal deterrence as another less prevalent but nonetheless important
benefit); see also M. Jared Marsh, The Class Action Lack of Fairness Act of 2002: Congress
Attempts to Federalize Class Action Lawsuits, 71 UMKC L. REV. 151, 151 (2002) (noting
two "paramount" purposes served by class action lawsuits).
257 See Sherman, supra note 255, at 223-24 (categorizing the class action as "one of the
most controversial procedural devices in the American legal system" while also describing
several benefits associated with class action litigation); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Class Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (highlight-
IN DEFENSE OF THE CLASS ACTION LA WSUIT
that the class action functions so effectively is specifically be-
cause it does look and function differently from other forms of
litigation.258 And it is within this bizarre "perversion" of tradi-
tional litigation practices that many people have found an outlet
and a forum in which they can air their frustrations and adjudi-
cate their claims-no matter how small or irrelevant such claims
are to the remainder of society.
What needs to happen then is not a change within the class
action device, but rather a change within the overall perception
of the class action. Arguing for a change in traditional philoso-
phy may seem outrageous or beyond the pale. And yet, if phi-
losophy was never allowed to shift over time, this country would
arguably still be operating under the "separate but equal" doc-
trine of Plessy v. Fergusen.259 Just as this country was able to
modify its archaic approval of "separate but equal,"260 it has come
time to modify the country's notion of the class action lawsuit.
The class action does not look like traditional litigation because it
is not meant to. Similarly, it does not conform to traditional no-
tions of litigation, nor should it have to. The class action is not
an offshoot of traditional litigation practices. 261 It is an entity in
and to itself. Just as arbitration and mediation are governed by
separate rules, so should be the class action. Not until the legal
system begins to develop an individual set of rules and regula-
tions surrounding the class action, will the view of class actions
as legalized blackmail begin to change.
ing "great social and legal utility" of class suits before describing scenarios where utility is
diminished).
258 See Locating, supra note 256, at 2666-67 (arguing that class action lawsuits provide
benefits such as administrative efficiency and optimal deterrence, which both stem from
important differences between class action and individual lawsuits); see also Marsh, supra
note 256, at 151 (claiming that class action lawsuits are beneficial because they allow for
more efficient use of judicial and individual resources and allow certain claims to be
brought that otherwise might be too insignificant to justify individual litigation).
259 163 U.S. 537, 547 (1896) (holding "separate but equal" is inherently equal).
260 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy and holding
"separate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
261 See Sherman, supra note 255, at 224-25 (calling the American class action an "in-
vention of equity" and illustrating how class actions were formally created by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23); but see Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Repre-
sentative Suit as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1011 (2003) (noting that the his-
torical model of class actions portrays class suits as a "specific variety of representative
actions").
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CONCLUSION
In light of the advantages that the class action brings to the le-
gal arena, the idea of dismissing it as nothing more than legal-
ized blackmail seems shortsighted. Perhaps the ultimate issue
lies not with the problems of the class action itself but with the
view of class actions as an offshoot of normal litigation practices.
The class action is inherently different from other forms of litiga-
tion.262 Within the class action context, there is no individual cli-
ent;263 the lawyer himself may have more of a financial interest
in the outcome than any individual member of the suit;264 and
the lawyer often assumes the role of a businessman as opposed to
an advocate. 265 The idea of the lawyer in this forum cannot be
reconciled with the idea of the lawyer as commonly recognized in
this country. To dismiss this as wrong, fails to recognize that al-
though such lawyers are not functioning in the same manner as
other lawyers, they are in fact still providing important services
within the legal community. 266 The ultimate answer is to stop
looking at such lawsuits as the same entity as other forms of liti-
gation. The class action may not fit into the same mold as other
forms of litigation, but maybe it is not meant to. The class action
is a law suit that allows a very different form of litigation and the
262 See Lilly, supra note 261, at 1009 (praising class actions for enabling one suit to en-
compass "dozens or even hundreds of individual actions"); see also Macey & Miller, supra
note 1, at 3-4 (emphasizing that, unlike normal litigation scenarios, class actions call for
more control by plaintiffs attorney and not the client).
263 See Sherman, supra note 255, at 223 (pointing out that class action suits allow indi-
viduals to sue on behalf of others similarly situated); see also Julie Klusas, Saving the
Class Action: Developing and Implementing a Model Rule of Professional Conduct for
Class Action Litigation, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 353, 359n.31 (2003) (stating "the de-
fined 'client' in traditional litigation is different than the amorphous 'client' in a class ac-
tion").
264 See Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972) (highlighting differences
between individual plaintiffs' interests and those of the class's attorney, and positing that
class attorneys might have greater financial interests in settlement); see also Coffee, su-
pra note 12 at 677-78 (recognizing that class suits are uniquely susceptible to "collusive
settlements that benefit plaintiffs attorney rather than their clients").
265 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 3-4 (labeling class action litigation as "entre-
preneurial litigation" due to unique role played by plaintiffs attorney); see also Coffee,
Understanding, supra note 15, at 677-78 (viewing plaintiffs attorney as a "utility-
maximizing entrepreneur who manages a portfolio of actions and thus makes litigation
decisions in an individual case based upon their overall impact on the portfolio").
266 See Deposit Guar. Nat'l. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (describing advan-
tages associated with class action lawsuits, which are often funded by contingent-fee ar-
rangements); see also Hensler & Rowe, supra note 187, at 137 (highlighting several social
benefits derived from the use of private class actions for money damages).
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ultimate answer may be to recognize it for the benefits that it
brings and stop trying to reconcile it with the ethical and practi-
cal rules that regulate the remainder of the legal arena.

